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I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1: Should this Court exercise its certiorari discretion to review the 
decision of the Court of Appeals where the Court of Appeals (a) ignored the standard applicable to 
review of a district court's decision on a Rule 11 motion and ignored the fact that the district court 
failed to make any determination as to whether Rule 11 was violated, (b) erroneously construed the 
district court's ruling, (c) the construction of the district court's ruling attached by the Court of 
Appeals would be clearly erroneous and not supported by any evidence in the record, (d) the Court 
of Appeals' conclusion that the constitutional issues raised by petitioners were not preserved in the 
district court is clearly erroneous and contrary to the record presented to the Court of Appeals, (e) 
the Court of Appeals' Decision fails entirely to address petitioners' appeal of the district court's 
order denying sanctions under Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., and (f) the Court of Appeals 
misapprehended the manner in which petitioners' constitutional arguments relate to the appeal. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Should this Court exercise its' certiorari discretion to address and 
resolve the important constitutional and public policy issues presented in connection with 
petitioners' appeal? Specifically, should this Court exercise its discretion to address and resolve the 
following two questions: 
(1) given this Court's prior ruling that a constitutional right of privacy exists with 
respect to one's financial and banking records, is a litigant required to provide prior 
notice to a non-party that the litigant is subpoenaing the non-parties' confidential 
financial information from the non-party's financial institution; and 
(2) is it improper for an attorney to delegate to his or her secretary the authority 
to sign subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts? 
1 
II. OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals' Decision dated 11 December 1997 (the "Decision"), and its decision 
denying petitioners' petition for rehearing dated 7 January 1998 are not reported. Copies of the 
Court of Appeals' Decisions and the decision denying petitioners' petition for rehearing are attached 
as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively, to the Appendix to this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.1 
III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioners appealed the final order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District Court Judge, 
entered on 15 October 1996 in Case No. 954300067 DA, Third Judicial District Court, Summit 
County, State of Utah. The Decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed was entered on 
11 December 1997. The decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners' petition for rehearing 
was entered on 7 January 1998. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
1. Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 7. 
2. Rule 26, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 8. 
2. Rule 30, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 9. 
3. Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P.; Appendix, Exhibit 10. 
4. Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution; Appendix, Exhibit 11. 
5. Form 30 Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena; Appendix, Exhibit 6. 
V. STATEMENT OF CASE 
This petition stems from the Defendant's violation of petitioners' constitutional rights to 
privacy in confidential banking records, and Defendant's blatant misuse of the subpoena power, in 
!In addition to the foregoing decisions, the following decisions of the trial court are relevant to the 
disposition of this matter: (a) Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, 5/16/96, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, 
8/23/96, Order, 10/15/96. The foregoing are attached as Exhibits 3, 4 and 5, respectively, to the Appendix 
2 
violation of Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. Petitioners, Terry Frank ("Frank") and Park City 
Pharmacy, Inc. ("PCP"), were not parties in the district court action below, but were the target of 
improperly issued and executed subpoenas. Specifically, Frank was served with two (2) subpoenas 
which were invalid because, inter alia, they were signed not by Defendant's attorney, Mitch Olsen 
("Mr. Olsen"), but by Mr. Olsen's secretary, in violation of Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. 
Additionally, PCP's confidential banking records were subpoenaed, seized and used by the 
Defendant/Appellee Audrey N. Holt (the "Defendant") without any prior notice being given to PCP, 
in violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 45, and in violation of PCP's constitutional right of privacy in its 
banking records. 
On 17 May 1995, Clifford E. Holt ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint for divorce against the 
Defendant. The divorce proceeding was highly contested and hostile. As a result, for a divorce 
proceeding, the Defendant pursued unusually extensive non-party discovery, primarily through the 
use of subpoenas. Two (2) of the targets of Defendant's non-party subpoena discovery were 
petitioners. Frank is, and always has been, the sole shareholder of PCP. 
In connection with Defendant's discovery efforts, Mr. Olsen's secretary signed at least 26 
subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers filed with the district court, including the subpoenas 
and deposition notices served on Frank. In addition to being invalid because these documents were 
signed by Mr. Olsen's secretary, the subpoenas did not contain the requisite notice to persons served 
with the subpoena as embodied in Utah R. Civ. P. Form 30, nor did it allow Frank the requisite 
minimum fourteen days within which to produce documents as required by Rule 45. 
In the interim, and unbeknownst to petitioners, Defendant had already purported to serve a 
subpoena on Bank One purporting to require Bank One to produce all of PCP's banking records for 
the prior three years. This subpoena was apparently sent to Bank One via a letter dated 14 February 
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1996, and did not contain the requisite notice to persons served with a subpoena. Curiously, despite 
serving the subpoena on Bank One on 14 February 1996, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff any 
notice of the Bank One subpoena until 11 March 1996, after Defendant had already obtained PCP's 
confidential banking records. Then, despite their knowledge that Frank asserted he was the sole 
shareholder of PCP, neither Defendant nor her counsel ever provided notice of the Bank One 
subpoena to Frank or PCP. Instead, Defendant used PCP's banking records in a deposition, while 
a motion for protective order, seeking protection of PCP confidential financial records, was pending. 
Upon being served with Defendant's improper subpoenas, petitioners filed a motion for 
protective order/motion to quash and sought to recover its' fees and expenses incurred in connection 
with filing of that motion. Petitioners' motion for protective order was granted at the 16 May 1996 
hearing, at which time the district court took under advisement the issue of whether to award fees 
and costs. Subsequent to that hearing, Defendant filed a frivolous motion for sanctions against 
petitioners, claiming that Mr. Frank had improperly failed to appear and produce documents at a 
deposition to which Mr. Frank had filed a timely objection. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion 
for sanctions under Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. The motion for sanctions and petitioners' 
previously pending request for an award of attorneys' fees was heard by the district court on 23 
August 1996. At that hearing, the district court re-emphasized the fact that it had granted petitioners' 
motion for protective order by ordering Defendant to deliver to petitioners the originals and all 
copies of any and all documents which Defendant had obtained from petitioners' bank. The district 
court denied, however, petitioners' motion for sanctions and request for attorneys' fees. 
Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal, which was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the Court of Appeals Decision dated 11 December 1997. The Court of Appeals 
subsequently denied petitioners' petition for rehearing pursuant to an order dated 7 January 1998. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Because this matter focuses on the improper use of subpoenas in non-party discovery, 
a brief introduction of Defendant's counsel is appropriate. Defendant was represented by Mitchell J. 
Olsen of the law firm Olsen & Olsen L.L.C. Mr. Olsen is an experienced domestics law attorney. He 
has practiced since 1982 (almost 16 years), and charges $150.00 per hour in domestic cases. (R. 785-
786). 
2. For a divorce proceeding, Defendant pursued unusually extensive non-party discovery 
through the use of subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, notices of deposition and notices of records 
deposition, consisting of subpoenas to approximately 26 non-parties, most of which are specifically 
identified on pp. 10-11 of petitioners' Brief of the Appellants. 
3. On 14 February 1996, Mr. Olsen served, via a letter, a subpoena on Bank One wherein 
Mr. Olsen sought to require Bank One to produce the banking records for PCP for the prior three 
years. R. 0800-0803. Curiously, it was only a month later, after he had already obtained PCP's 
confidential documents from Bank One, that Mr. Olsen finally notified the Plaintiffs counsel of the 
Bank One subpoena. Mr. Olsen never provided any notice whatsoever to Frank or PCP of the 
subpoena to Bank One. See R. 0349-0350, 0798-0802. 
4. On 7 March 1996, Frank supplied Mr. Olsen with an affidavit, and testified: 
I am the sole owner of Park City Pharmacy located in Park City. Cliff Holt is 
an employee only. 
R. 333, paragraph 3. 
5. All of Mr. Olsen's subpoenas of PCP's banking records were concealed from PCP. 
No one in a representative capacity for PCP was served with the other bank subpoenas and related 
deposition notices. See R. 262-270,281-283, 349-350, and 798-803. PCP became aware of all of Mr. 
Olsen's subpoenas of PCP's bank records in reviewing the record for this appeal. 
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6. Mr. Olsen's subpoenas were issued without supplying to the subpoenaed banks the 
Utah R. Civ. P. Form 30 Notice or anything substantially similar thereto. See, e.g., R. 304-308, 373-
377, 402-410, and 611-616. Indeed, the district court record is devoid of any evidence that Mr. Olsen 
provided the requisite prior notice or substance of the Form 30 Notice to any subpoenaed non-party. 
7. Mr. Olsen did not sign many of the subpoenas and related deposition notices; rather, 
at least 26 subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers filed with the district court were signed by 
Mr. Olsen's secretary, Liz Beall.2 See, e.g. R. 0335-0346, 0353-0370, 0378-0380, 0396-0410, 0419-
0422, 0467-0472, 0523-0524, 0548-0552. Indeed, Mr. Olsen has admitted that he allowed his 
secretary to sign the documents in question. R. 610. 
8. Frank was served with two (2) subpoenas and deposition notices which were signed 
by Mr. Olsen's secretary. The subpoena duces tecum served on Mr. Frank did not allow him the 
requisite 14 days in which to respond, and did not contain the the Form 30 Notice to the subpoenaed 
parties. Additionally, Frank was served, in his individual capacity, with a subpoena duces tecum 
demanding he produce documents belonging to PCP, a separate legal entity. See R. 406 
9. Mr. Olsen's secretary improperly signed and purported to serve subpoenas upon non-
parties located in the States of New York, California, Colorado, Florida, and Washington. See R. 258, 
260-266, 271-272, 273-274, 275-276, 277-278, 279-280, and 345-346. 
2It took a while for Frank, PCP, and their counsel to discover this impropriety. In responding to Frank's 
Motion for Protective Order and to Quash, Mr. Olsen submitted an affidavit outlining the attorneys fees and costs 
purportedly incurred with respect to the discovery at issue. A copy of Mr. Olsen's Affidavit (R. 538-541) is Exhibit 
7 to the Appendix. The signature page (R. 540) shows Mr. Olsen's authentic signature, and the signature of Ms. 
Beall (her own signature) notarizing the affidavit. The signature on Mr. Olsen's affidavit perplexed counsel for 
Frank and PCP: a completely different signature appeared on the subpoena and deposition notice served upon 
Frank, which were at issue. A copy of the Frank subpoena duces tecum (R. 543-546) is Exhibit 8 to the Appendix. 
A copy of the related deposition notice (R. 548-550) is Exhibit 9 to the Appendix. Upon further inspection, Frank 
and PCP solved the mystery: In the letter supplied to Frank with the Frank subpoena and deposition notice, Ms. 
Beall signed Mr. Olsen's name "Mitchell J. Olsen/Lb" indicating that she signed the letter on behalf of Mr. Olsen. 
A comparison of the various documents conclusively shows that Ms. Beall signed Mr. Olsen's signature on the 
Frank subpoena and deposition notice. 
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10. Mr. Olsen's discovery abuse did not stop with the improper use of subpoenas. Indeed, 
Defendant used some of PCP's banking records after Frank had filed a motion for protective order 
with the district court, but before the district court ruled on the motion. In that motion, PCP and 
Frank, specifically sought the protection of PCP's confidential banking records from unrestricted 
public disclosure. Moreover, this occurred after the district court had already granted a Protective 
Order to another non-party ordering exclusion of most of his banking records and protection of the 
few documents requiring production R. 454. 
11. On 1 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion for protective order/motion to quash to 
prevent the disclosure of Frank's personal and PCP's confidential financial information. R. 411-430. 
12.. In their motion for protective order, Frank and PCP sought protection of Frank's 
personal and PCP's "banking records." R. 414 to 416. After Frank filed the motion for protective 
order, but before the district court ruled on that motion, Mr. Olsen used in a deposition, and thus 
publicly published the very types of confidential financial records which were the subject of the 
pending motion for protective order. R. 586.3 
13. Notwithstanding Frank's pending motion for protective order and motion to quash, and 
notwithstanding the great limitations placed by the district court upon discovery of similar banking 
records relating to Plaintiffs father, Mr. Olsen used and publicly published PCP's banking records, 
while keeping secret from Frank and PCP his possession of the same. R. 525-597. 
Petitioners acknowledge that, as a technical matter, their motion for protective order was not directed 
toward the Bank One subpoena. However, this is only because Mr. Olsen never disclosed to PCP or its attorneys 
the fact that he had already served the subpoena on Bank One and had already obtained PCP's confidential banking 
records. Indeed, although Mr. Olsen and counsel for Frank and PCP had corresponded and discussed issues 
telephonically, no information was ever conveyed to counsel for Frank and PCP to suggest that the confidential 
bank records of PCP had been obtained from Bank One and were already in Mr. Olsen's possession. The facts and 
circumstances relating to Mr. Olsen's devious conduct in this regard are set forth in Frank's Reply in Support of his 
Motion for Protective Order and to Quash (R. 525-552), and Frank and PCP's Motion for Sanctions (R. 553-597). 
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14. Frank and PCP's motion for protective order was granted by the district court on 16 
May 1996. However, the district court took the issues of fees under advisement. See R. 0739; 0729-
0730; 0732; 0733; 0737; 0744. 
15. On 23 August 1996, the district court ordered that Defendant return to PCP all PCP's 
banking records which Defendant had obtained from Bank One. R. 0872-0873. Additionally, the 
district court denied Frank's and PCP's request for attorneys' fees and sanctions, stating: 
As I recall, this case has represented a very acrimonious, cantankerous, 
long, drawn-out lawsuit, where there have been allegations and counter 
allegations of deceit and subterfuge and concealment and 
noncompliance and noncooperation, ad nauseam. Let's just leave it 
alone, and let both sides bare whatever costs you have incurred in 
pursuing it or defending or counter-defense or counter-pursuit and 
understand that the case is over now." 
R. 0874. 
16. Although the district court denied petitioners' request for attorneys' fees, the district 
court failed to rule on the primary issue of whether Mr. Olsen's conduct violated Rules 11 and 45, 
UtahR. Civ. P. SeeR. 861-876, 810-811. 
17. The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court made a finding of fact that petitioners 
"had created considerable difficulties in the discovery process." Court of Appeals Decision at 2, 
Exhibit 1 to the Appendix. 
18. The Court of Appeals failed to rule on the primary issue of whether Mr. Olsen's 
conduct violated Rules 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P. Court of Appeals Decision, Exhibit 1 to Appendix. 
19. The Court of Appeals found that although petitioners presented a number of 
"...interesting and serious constitutional arguments, they failed to indicate where these issues appear 
in the record as presented to the trial court as required by Rule 25 [sic](a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure." Court of Appeals Decision, n.l, Exhibit 1 to Appendix. The Court of Appeals 
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then appeared to conclude that as a result of such failure, petitioners had failed to preserve the 
constitutional arguments in the trial court. See id. 
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court should exercise its discretion to review the Court of Appeals' Decision because: 
• The Court of Appeals ignored the standard applicable to review of a district court's 
decision on a Rule 11 motion, and ignored the fact that the district court failed to make 
any determination as to whether Rule 11 was violated; 
• The Court of Appeals' determination that the district court made a factual finding that 
the petitioners had created difficulties in the discovery process misapprehends the 
district court's ruling; 
• Assuming arguendo that the district court made a factual finding that petitioners had 
created difficulty in the discovery process, such a factual finding is clearly erroneous 
and is not supported by any evidence in the record; 
• The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the constitutional issues raised by petitioners 
were not preserved in the district court is clearly erroneous and clearly contrary to the 
record; 
• The Court of Appeals' decision fails to address petitioners' appeal of the district 
court's order denying sanctions under Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P.; and 
• The Court of Appeals misapprehended the manner in which petitioners' constitutional 
arguments relate to the appeal. 
Even if this Court elects not to review the Court of Appeals' ruling with respect to the denial 
of sanctions, this Court should exercise its certiorari discretion to resolve the important constitutional 
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and public policy issues presented in petitioners' appeal. Specifically, petitioners' request that this 
Court address and resolve the following issues: 
• given this Court's prior ruling that a constitutional right of privacy exists with respect 
to one's financial and banking records, is a litigant required to provide prior notice to 
a non-party that the litigant is subpoenaing the non-parties' confidential financial 
information from the non-party's financial institution; and 
• is it improper for an attorney to delegate to his or her secretary the authority to sign 
subpoenas, deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts? 
These issues are ones which virtually every trial lawyer in the State of Utah may face. It is 
appropriate for this Court to offer guidance to the members of the Bar on these important issues. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS CERTIORARI DISCRETION 
BECAUSE, IN RENDERING ITS DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS 
SIGNIFICANTLY STRAYED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL 
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
A. THE COURT O F APPEALS IGNORED THE STANDARD APPLICABLE T O REVIEW 
O F A DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION ON A RULE 11 MOTION, AND IGNORED 
THE FACT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED T O MAKE A 
DETERMINATION AS T O WHETHER RULE 11 WAS VIOLATED. 
Before a trial court can properly award or deny sanctions under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., the 
trial court must first determine whether Rule 11 has been violated. See, e.g., Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 110 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 1989) ("[i]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is 
mandated"). The Court of Appeals appears to have recognized this rule, as it identified the following 
as the standard applicable to review of a trial court's determination with respect to a Rule 11 motion: 
we review the trial court's conclusion that rule 11 was or was not violated under a 
correction of error standard and the trial court's determination of the type and amount 
of sanction under an abuse of discretion standard. 
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Court of Appeals' Decision at 1, Exhibit 1 to the Appendix. 
Although this two (2) prong analysis identified by the Court of Appeals is correct in so far as 
it goes,4 the Court of Appeals ignored the first prong of the standard which it identified in its Decision. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals failed to address the issue of the "trial court's conclusion that rule 
11 was or was not violated . . ." Such failure is important because one of the major flaws of the 
district court's ruling from which petitioners appealed was the district court's failure to rule on this 
issue. Otherwise stated, even though the district court was presented with a motion for sanctions 
under Rule 11, the court never made any determination as to whether Rule 11 had been violated. 
Rather, the district court skipped over this fundamental condition precedent to determining what 
sanctions, if any, to impose under Rule 11, and simply ruled it was not going to award sanctions. The 
Court of Appeals' failure to address this fundamental flaw with the district court's order is important 
because, as this Court has previously made clear, "[i]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate 
sanction is mandated." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171. Having failed to make the fundamental 
determination as to whether Rule 11 was violated, it was improper for the district court, and 
subsequently the Court of Appeals, to refuse to award any sanctions at all under Rule 11. 
B. THE COURT O F APPEALS' DETERMINATION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT MADE A 
FACTUAL FINDING THAT PETITIONERS HAD CREATED DIFFICULTIES IN THE 
DISCOVERY PROCESS MISAPPREHENDS THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING. 
The primary reason stated by the Court of Appeals as grounds for affirmance of the district 
court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions was that 
This Court has made clear that there is actually a three-pronged analysis which applies to the review of a 
trial court's Rule 11 determination. See, e.g., Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992) (appellate courts should 
use a three standard approach in reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 findings: the appellate court must (1) review the 
trial court's finding of fact under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) review the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
Rule 11 was violated under the correction of error standard; and (3) review the trial court's determination as to the 
type and amount of sanction to be opposed under the abuse of discretion standard). 
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The trial court was clearly of the mind that the parties to this appeal each had 
created considerable difficulties in the discovery process. . . 
This conclusion is erroneous and misapprehends the district court's statement to which the Court of 
Appeals referred. The district court did not make any factual finding that petitioners had created any 
difficulties in the discovery process. Rather, the district court specifically concluded that it was the 
parties to the underlying action, i.e., the Defendant Audrey Holt and her ex-husband Clifford Holt, 
who had created difficulties in the discovery process. Specifically, the district court stated: 
As I recall, this case has represented a very acrimonious, cantankerous, long, 
drawn-out lawsuit, where there have been allegations and counter allegations 
of deceit and subterfuge and concealment and noncompliance and 
noncooperation ad nauseam. 
R. 0874. In making this statement, the district court was referring specifically to the Plaintiff and 
Defendant in the underlying action - the district court was not referring to petitioners.5 
C. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE DISTRICT COURT MADE A FACTUAL FINDING 
THAT PETITIONERS HAD CREATED DIFFICULTY IN THE DISCOVERY PROCESS, SUCH 
FACTUAL FINDING IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
Assuming, arguendo, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the district court's ruling is 
correct, and that the district court did conclude that petitioners created difficulties in the discovery 
process, such "finding of fact" is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by any evidence in the 
5On the contrary, at the 16 May 1996 hearing, the district court specifically found that petitioners' motion 
for protective order was well taken, as the district court granted petitioners' motion for protective order. See, e.g, 
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at R. 0730, 0738. Similarly, at the 23 August 1996 hearing the district court 
again expressly recognized that petitioners' motion for protective order was well taken as the district court ordered 
the Defendant to destroy all documents in her possession which had been unlawfully obtained from Bank One. See, 
e.g., Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at R. 0872-0873. 
Furthermore, there is no question that the underlying litigation was long, drawn-out and cantankerous, and 
that the parties to the underlying litigation — i.e., the Defendant and her ex-husband, had engaged in objectionable 
conduct. However, the fact that the Defendant and her ex-husband engaged in improper conduct in the underlying 
litigation cannot provide a proper basis for the district court and Court of Appeals to refuse to impose sanctions on 
the Defendant and her counsel. The improper conduct engaged in by the Defendant and her ex-husband simply 
does not give the Defendant and her counsel the right to trample on petitioners' constitutional rights, and to engage 
in patent violations of Rule 11. 
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record. Petitioners had nothing whatsoever to do with the underlying litigation until Terry Frank was 
served with a subpoena in March 1996, a year and a half after the underlying litigation had been 
commenced. The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that Petitioners created any difficulties 
in the discovery process. On the contrary, petitioners sought simply to protect their constitutional 
rights of privacy in their private financial records. Filing a motion to protect such rights can in no way 
be construed as creating difficulties in the discovery process. There simply is no evidence in the 
record to support any determination that petitioners created difficulties in the discovery process and, 
accordingly, any such finding of fact by the district court, and subsequent basis for ruling by the Court 
of Appeals, is clearly erroneous. 
D. THE COURT O F APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
RAISED BY PETITIONERS WERE NOT PRESERVED IN THE DISTRICT COURT IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY T O THE RECORD. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision was apparently based, at least in part, on the conclusion that 
petitioners' did not preserve the constitutional issues raised in their appeal in the district court. Such 
conclusion is clearly erroneous. On the contrary, set forth in the Brief of the Appellants, Statement 
of Facts at flj 11, 18, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34-36, 41, 42, and in the Reply Brief of the Appellants at pp. 3, 
4, and 14, the constitutional issues were expressly raised in connection with petitioners' motion for 
protective order and petitioners' motion for sanctions. 
Petitioners recognize that, as the Court of Appeals states in note 1 of its Decision, petitioners 
inadvertently failed to cite to the record in the Statement of the Issues portion of the Brief of the 
Appellants. However, the Court of Appeals itself has previously recognized that a technical violation 
of Rule 24, Utah R. App. P. is not, in and of itself, grounds for refusal to address issues on appeal 
which have been preserved in the court below. See, e.g., Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870, 876 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (court refused to stnke a party's appeal bnef which failed to comply with Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), and reached the merits of the appeal).6 
E. THE COURT O F APPEALS' DECISION FAILS T O ADDRESS PETITIONERS' 
APPEAL O F THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DENYING SANCTIONS UNDER 
RULE 45, UTAH R. CIV. P. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision focuses exclusively on petitioners' appeal of the distnct 
court's order denying sanctions under Rule 11. However, petitioners' appeal was not limited to 
appealing from the district court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions. Rather, petitioners also appealed the 
district's court's failure to determine whether Defendant violated Rule 45, Utah R. Civ P., and 
appealed the distnct court's order denying sanctions under Rule 45(c)(1), Utah R. Civ. P.7 
The Court of Appeals' failure to address this aspect of the appeal is crucial inasmuch as the 
constitutional arguments raised by petitioners relate directly to Rule 45.s As set discussed more fully 
furthermore, as set forth above, specific citations to the record with respect to the constitutional issues and 
whether the subpoenas were void appear throughout petitioners' appeal briefs Furthermore, the relevant motions 
and memoranda wherein the issues were raised were attached as Exhibits 10, 11 and 12 to the Addendum to the 
Bnef of the Appellants ("Appellants' Addendum") Additionally, the transcripts of the 16 May 1996 hearing and the 
23 August 1996 hearing wherein the issues were discussed were provided to the Court of Appeals as Exhibits 13 
and 14 to Appellants' Addendum Moreover, in its Decision, this Court of Appeals expressly acknowledges having 
reviewed the transcripts of the hearings and, therefore, the Court of Appeals had its own independent knowledge of 
the fact that these issues were raised and preserved in the district court Given such facts, the Court of Appeals' 
failure to reach the merits of petitioners' appeal based upon petitioners' failure to strictly comply with the 
requirements or Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah R App P would be to elevate form over substance, a practice which is not 
condoned by this Court See, e g, Buzas Baseball Inc v Salt Lake Trappers, Inc , 952 P 2d 941, 947, n 4 (Utah 
1996) ("[w]hile Buzas Baseball brought this action by filing a verified complaint rather than a motion, as 
contemplated by the statutes, requiring the trial court to grant a motion to dismiss on that basis would elevate form 
over substance ") 
Additionally, m its Decision, the Court of Appeals cites to Trimball Real Estate v Monte Vista Ranch Inc 
758 P 2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct App 1988) for the proposition that it is proper to decline on appeal to address 
unpreserved arguments Appellants do not contest this well-accepted principal However, Trimball Real Estate 
simply is not applicable to this appeal, where it is clear that all of the arguments raised on this appeal were in fact 
preserved m the trial court below 
7These issues were specifically identified in the Docketing Statement filed with the Court of Appeals, and 
were argued m the Brief of the Appellants and Reply Brief of Appellants filed with the Court of Appeals 
8In its Decision, the Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional issues raised by petitioners, in 
part, because the Court of Appeals asserted that "appellants have failed to present adequate legal argument and 
analvsis sufficient to assist us in understanding how these issues relate m any relevant way to the denial of Rule 11 
sanctions appealed " Court of Appeals' Decision, n 1 Contrary to the Court of Appeals' apparent 
(continued ) 
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below, Rule 45, combined with the Utah Constitution, require a party to litigation to give prior notice 
to a non-party of its efforts to obtain that non-party's confidential financial information. Additionally, 
Rule 45 and the Utah Constitution require that a subpoena be signed by an attorney (not his secretary 
as was done here), that the requisite Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena be attached to the 
subpoena (which was not done here), that the person commanded to produce documents have at least 
14 days within which to comply with the subpoena (which was not done here), and that the attorney 
serving the subpoena take steps to insure that the person served with the subpoena not be subject to 
under burden or expense (which was not done here). Failure to comply with these obligations subjects 
the violating attorney to "an appropriate sanction, which may include, but is not limited to, lost 
earnings and a reasonable attorney's fees." Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1). Thus, the constitutional issues, 
the validity of the subpoenas and counsel's conduct in allowing a secretary to sign pleadings on his 
behalf is relevant to whether the Defendant violated Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., and to whether 
Petitioners are entitled to recover their costs, expenses and attorneys' fees under Rule 45. 
F. THE COURT O F APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE MANNER IN WHICH PETITIONERS' 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS RELATE T O THE APPEAL. 
The Court of Appeals states that petitioners failed to adequately explain how the constitutional 
issues raised in the appeal relate to the denial of Rule 11 sanctions. Court of Appeals Decision, n. 1, 
Exhibit 1 to the Appendix. In making this determination, the Court of Appeals apparently 
misapprehended the relationship of the constitutional issues to the appeal. Whether the Defendant 
violated petitioners' constitutional rights by serving subpoenas which had been unlawfully signed by 
a secretary and which did not comply with other requirements of Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., whether 
the Defendant failed to give petitioners' prior notice of the Bank One subpoena, as mandated by Rule 
8(...continued) 
misapprehension, however, petitioners do not assert that the constitutional issues necessarily relate to the denial of 
sanctions under Rule 11. Rather, the constitutional issues relate directly to the denial of sanctions under Rule 45. 
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45 and the Utah Constitution, and whether the Defendant served a subpoena on Bank One that did not 
comport with the requirements of Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., relates directly to whether the Defendant 
violated Rule 11, and whether sanctions should be imposed under Rule 11. If the conduct engaged 
in by Mr. Olsen is determined to have violated Rule 11, then an appropriate sanction is mandatory. 
Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171 ("[i]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated"). 
The constitutional issues also relate directly to petitioners' motion for sanctions under Rule 
45, Utah R. Civ. P., an aspect of the appeal which the Court of Appeals' Decision fails to address. 
See supra for a discussion of this point. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS CERTIORARI DISCRETION TO ADDRESS 
AND RESOLVE THE IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN 
PETITIONERS' APPEAL. 
The Court of Appeals expressly recognized that petitioners' appeals presents "a number of 
interesting and serious constitutional arguments . . ." Court of Appeals' Decision, n. 1. This Court 
should exercise its certiorari discretion to address and resolve these important issues, which are ones 
which face virtually every trial lawyer in the state of Utah. These specific issues, and a brief 
discussion relating to these issues, are set forth below. 
A. GIVEN THIS COURT'S PRIOR RULING THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY EXISTS WITH RESPECT TO ONE'S FINANCIAL AND BANKING 
RECORDS, IS A LITIGANT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE PRIOR NOTICE TO A NON-
PARTY THAT THE LITIGANT IS SUBPOENAING THE NON-PARTY'S 
CONFIDENTIAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM THE NON-PARTY'S 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION? 
This Court has previously held that persons are constitutionally protected "against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank statements, checks, bonds, loan applications, loan 
guarantees, and all papers which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] 
financial affairs upon a reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential." State 
v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991). Given this constitutional right of privacy, one of the 
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questions which petitioners ask this Court to address and resolve is whether a litigant is required to 
provide a non-party prior notice of the litigant's attempts to subpoena or otherwise obtain confidential 
financial information from the non-party's financial institution.9 
Petitioners believe that the answer to this question must be a resounding yes. Given this 
Court's determination that persons have a constitutional right of privacy in their banking records, the 
only way that right can be protected is if the person is provided prior notice of a litigant's attempts to 
obtain the person's private banking information, so as to afford the affected person an opportunity to 
object to the subpoena or otherwise obtain a protective order to protect the confidentiality of the 
information which is being sought. The importance of such a prior notice requirement is keenly 
demonstrated by the facts of this case. 
Here, the Defendant failed to provide petitioners with any notice whatsoever of Mr. Olsen's 
subpoenas to banks for PCP's banking record. Yet Rule 45 clearly requires the subpoenaing party to 
provide "prior notice" of any commanded production or inspection of documents. Utah R. Civ. P. 
45(b)(1)(A). "The purpose of this notice to afford the other parties. . . the opportunity to object to the 
production [of documents] or inspection [of premises] and was inserted into the rule to prevent ex 
parte abusive and illegal use of the subpoena power. United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. 
43, 47 (D.P. R. 1995). This "prior notice" requirement has constitutional underpinnings. 
Although the right of privacy in banking records which this Court recognized in Thompson 
arose in the context of a criminal case, other courts have recognized that person's constitutional right 
of privacy extends to banking records subpoenaed in noncriminal matters. For example, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has already recognized that, in the context of a government agency conducting an 
Petitioners believe this prior notice requirement includes an obligation on a litigation to provide the 
requisite Form 30 Notice to Persons Served With a Subpoena to a bank which is served with a subpoena, a 
requirement which already is embodied in Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P., but which was ignored by the Defendant and 
her counsel throughout the proceedings in the district court. 
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investigation in a civil matter, the agency can only obtain confidential financial information once it 
has obtained a written order of the court, and only after it has given notice to the person whose 
confidential bank records the agency is going to subpoena. See State v. Waite, 803 P.2d 1279, 1281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Utah's Financial Information Privacy Act, Utah Code Ann.§§ 78-
27-45 to 50.).10 
The prior notice provisions in Rule 45, and the Form 30 Notice, if followed, assure that before 
the execution of the subpoena the non-party will have an opportunity to (a) test the constitutional 
validity of a subpoena concerning its banking records, (b) object to the scope of a subpoena 
concerning their banking records, and (c) seek protection in the form of a protective order from 
unrestricted public disclosure of their confidential banking records. Non-parties' constitutional rights 
Other jurisdictions are in accord. For example, a person's constitutional right to notice prior to the 
execution of a subpoena of their financial records was upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court when it stated: 
under the Colorado Constitution a bank customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
bank's records of the customer's financial transactions. As a result, those records are protected by 
the Colorado Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures. The core value to which 
the constitulional protection is extended is the customer's privacy interest. In order to give effect 
to that protection, the customer must have an opportunity to test the constitutional validity of 
an administrative subpoena before it is executed. 
People v Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Colo. 1987) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, when presented with a situation in a civil context where no prior notice of a subpoena for 
confidential records had been given to the affected non-party, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York stated: 
In this situation the court believes that fair play demands that formal notice in accordance with 
the requirements of due process be served upon an owner of books and records by the person who 
subpoenas a third party custodian to produce such books and records, before production is 
required. Only in this manner may an owner have an opportunity to be heard in order to 
protect his rights and interests which may extend far beyond the books and records themselves. 
Alma - Schuhfabrik Ag vs. Rosenthal, 25 F.R.D. 100, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (emphasis added). 
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of privacy must not be subordinated to the litigants' zealous interests, at the discretion of the litigant's 
attorney in violation of his or her fiduciary duty as an officer of the court.11 
B. THE SECOND IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUE WHICH THIS COURT SHOULD 
ADDRESS IS WHETHER AN ATTORNEY MAY DELEGATE T O HIS OR HER 
SECRETARY THE AUTHORITY T O SIGN SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITION NOTICES 
AND OTHER PAPERS T O BE FILED WITH THE COURTS. 
The second "interesting and important" public policy issue raised in connection with this 
matter is whether an attorney may do that which was done by Mr. Olsen in the proceedings in the 
district court — i.e, can an attorney delegate to his or her secretary the authority to sign subpoenas, 
deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts. Petitioners respectfully submit that the 
answer to this question must be a resounding no. 
Even a casual reading of the applicable rules demonstrates that an attorney's secretary cannot 
properly sign subpoenas, deposition notices or other papers to be filed with the courts. Under Rule 
45(a)(3) only the Clerk of the Court, and "an attorney admitted to practice in the Court in which 
the action is pending" may issue and sign subpoenas "as an officer of the court." (Emphasis added). 
Historically, courts have carefully guarded the subpoena power. The change to allow attorneys to 
directly and unilaterally issue subpoenas occurred only three years ago. Neither the Utah legislature 
nor the Utah courts have shared the subpoena power with an attorney's non-licensed staff members. 
Similarly, Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., makes clear that a secretary cannot sign subpoenas, 
deposition notices and other papers to be filed with the courts: 
As noted by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, "abuse of the subpoena 
power is an actionable tort." Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. at 48. In addition, where the attorney acts as "an officer 
of the court", Rule 45(c), Utah R. Civ. P., the attorney's failure to provide prior notice before a non-party's 
confidential banking records are searched and seized would result in an unconstitutional depravation of the non-
party's civil rights, giving rise to a federal § 19893 claim. If the injured non-party cannot obtain relief from the 
court which issued the subpoena, the only way the non-party will get relief is by pursuing such claims. This Court 
should adopt and enforce policies and positions such as a prior notice requirement which will reduce, not enlarge 
the civil litigation dockets, of Utah's district courts. 
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Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name who is duly licensed 
to practice in the state of Utah. . . . fSJignature of an attorney constitutes a 
certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the 
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation (emphasis added). 
Utah R. Civ. P.l 1 (emphasis added). 
A secretary's signature does not fulfill the attorney's Rule 11 requirements. Rather, it short 
circuits the certification mandate of Rule 11, and constitutes a misrepresentation to the Court, to 
opposing counsel, and to the non-parties served or affected that the subpoenas, deposition notices and 
other papers have been signed by the attorney. It is a practice that should not be condoned, and this 
Court should exercise its discretion in this matter to declare definitively to the members of the Bar that 
they may not engage in such practices. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should exercise its discretion to review the Decision 
of the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, even if this Court were to determine that the district court's 
and Court of Appeals' denial of sanctions under Rules 11 and 45 is proper, this Court should exercise 
its discretion to address and resolve the important constitutional and public policy issues presented. 
it/' da; Dated this£/ j_ y of February, 1998. 
FOSTER& FOSTER L.C. 
By: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Brett L. Foster 
Ronald F. Price 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of February 1998, two copies of the foregoing 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed via First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Mitch Olsen 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8138 South State Street 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Clifford E. Holt, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
Audrey N. Holt, 
Defendant. 
Terrance E. Frank; and Park 
City Pharmacy, Inc., 
Third-party Appellants, 
v. 
Audrey N. Holt, 
Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 960732-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 11, 1997) 
Third District, Coalville Department 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys Lynn G. Foster and Brett L. Foster, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Mitchell J. Olsen and Martin N. Olsen, Midvale, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson. 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Appellants challenge the trial court's decision, denying 
their motion for costs and attorney fees under Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. When reviewing a trial court's 
rule 11 determination, we review the trial court's conclusion 
that rule 11 was or was not violated under a correction of error 
standard and the trial court's determination of • the type and 
amount of sanction under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992); SchQney V, 
Memorial Estates. Inc.. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
First, we note, the transcript of the August 23, 1996 
hearing held on appellants' motion for sanctions and attorney 
fees as well as the May 16, 1996 hearing transcript adequately 
represent the factual findings made by the trial court to allow 
our review of the court's decision to deny appellants's motion 
for sanctions and attorney fees, reflected in the October 15, 
1996 order. 
Having reviewed the transcript and order, and the scant 
legal argument appellants direct to the issue subject to review,1 
we conclude that the trial court did not err. "Rule 11 'Ives 
trial courts great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit Lne 
requirements of the particular case." See Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this case, 
the trial court was clearly of the mind that the parties to this 
appeal each had created considerable difficulties in the 
discovery process and that as such neither was entitled to 
sanctions or attorney fees against the other. 
Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
1. Although appellants' present in their brief a number of 
interesting and serious constitutional arguments, they fail to 
indicate where these issues appear in the record as presented to 
the trial court: as required by Rule 25(a) (5) (A), of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Trimble Real Est^tf* v. Monte 
Vista Ranch. Inc. . 758 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(declining on appeal to address unpreserved argument). In 
addition, appellants have failed to present adequate legal 
argument and analysis sufficient to assist us in understanding 
how these issues relate in any relevant way to the denial of Rule 
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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 7 - 1998 
Julia D'Aieaandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Clifford E. Holt, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Audrey N. Holt, 
Defendant. 
Terrance E. Frank; and 
Park City Pharmacy, Inc., 
Third-party Appellants, 
v, 
Audrey N. Holt, 
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ORDER 
Case No. 960732-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition 
for rehearing, filed December 26, 1997. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this \" 
FOR THE COURT: 
day of January, 1991 
Normarf'H. Jackson, #udge 
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D e f e n d a n t . 
C i v i l No . 9 5 4 3 0 0 0 6 7 
H o n o r a b l e P a t B . B r i a n 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Coalville, Utah 
May 16, 1996 
BRAD J . YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 THE COURT: I want to have Counsel tell the Court, in 
2 a very definitive manner, what it is you want in the discovery 
3 process, and what evidence you have to present to the Court to 
4 authorize you to continue to pursue it. Go ahead. 
5 MR. OLSEN: Can I do that? 
6 THE COURT: Yes. 
7 MR. OLSEN: If I might just speak one minute to what 
8 Miss Saunders has indicated. This started clear back with 
9 Judge Noel, your Honor, we came before the Court, and they 
10 provided all this horrendous evidence that Mr. Holt was making 
11 some $4,000 a month. And we provided all kinds of evidence 
12 that indicated that he did not. For instance, during 1994, he 
13 paid my client, alone, just moneys to her, over $87,000. You 
14 can't do that on $4,000 a month. It is physically impossible. 
15 And I was grateful. 
16 But Mr. Holt finally admitted in his deposition in 
17 1994, and this is completely different than what he has 
18 indicated throughout the discovery process, but he finally 
19 admitted in his deposition that he made $100,000 in 1994. So 
20 J it has taken us that long to finally get to someplace. 
21 But the problem is this. And Mr. Foster is here to 
22 address it. You hear this all the time, but I will just tell 
23 you why I need this information. I am sure the Court has had 
24 an opportunity to review all the mountains of things I have 
25 presented and what Mr. Foster has presented. I am just very 
surprised. I requested something that was, in my opinion, 
very, very simple, your Honor. I asked that Mr. Frank — I 
asked that he provide copies of checks given by Mr. Frank, who 
Mr. Holt believes — at least alleges that is his boss, the 
checks that were given by Mr. Frank to the defendant. 
Now, in his interrogatories, he alleges that 
Mr. Frank loaned him some $65,000 in 1994. Well, we believe i 
is income. All we want to do is see the checks that have been 
given by Mr. Frank to Mr. Holt. I think that's discoverable. 
How in the world can it not be? 
THE COURT: Why isn't the defendant forthcoming, or 
the plaintiff forthcoming with that information? 
MR. OLSEN: He doesn't have it. 
MS. SAUNDERS: We don't have it. 
MR. OLSEN: The checks are with Mr. Frank. He would 
have paid the checks to Mr. Holt. The checks would have been 
returned to Mr. Frank. The issue here, your Honor, is income. 
That's it. 
THE COURT: Let's ask Counsel where the checks are. 
MR. FOSTER: Would you like me to speak to that? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. FOSTER: The Court is trying to rein this case 
in, instead of let it just get out of hand. 
MR. FOSTER: We don't have any problem, your Honor, 
at all, with abiding by the Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
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1 providing appropriate documents. What Mr, Olsen has to say is, 
2 A, is an exaggeration, at best, and something much worse than 
3 that, at worst. He didn't ask Mr. Frank for Mr. Frank's 
4 documents. He asked Mr, Frank personally, and not in a 
5 representative capacity, the documents of Park City Pharmacy. 
6 We didn't object to providing the documents, per se. We 
7 objected if they were not relevant, and we laid claim to bank 
8 records being confidential, 
9 I spoke with this man, and asked him if he would like 
10 to propose a stipulated protective order, to which he did not 
11 have time to devote attention. We don't have to make those 
12 records available and have him expose them in a deposition. 
13 When I talked with him on the phone, he had already subpoenaed 
14 Park City Pharmacy, Inch's records. I represent Park City 
15 Pharmacy, I formed the company. I issued the stock 
16 certificates subject to signature by the people. I am still 
17 counsel of record. And Terry Frank is the registered agent for 
18 J service of process for that company, and has seen no corporate 
19 I subpoena or copy of any subpoena. 
20 These people do a submarine subpoena. By that I mean 
21 they did not serve Park City Pharmacy with a copy, and they go 
22 directly to Park City Pharmacy's bank records in Bank One, get 
23 those records, and after we have filed our motion for 
24 J protective order to preserve the confidentiality of these 
25 documents, and I am speaking with this man, he does not tell me 
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1 that he has possession of Park City Pharmacy records, 
2 concerning which I have asserted a claim of confidentiality. 
3 But, rather, he takes Mr. Holt's deposition, and exposes those 
4 documents as exhibits on a nonconfidential basis, and then I 
5 learn about it after the deposition, that our documents have 
6 been obtained without our knowledge, from our bank, and no 
7 effort has been made to put them under seal, to advise me, so 
8 that I can come to this Court and say, your Honor, we have an 
9 I objection to these being provided. We want a protective order, 
10 if they are relevant. We want them excluded, if they are not 
11 relevant. It seems to me reasonable. 
12 THE COURT: And the Court thinks that's reasonable, 
13 also. Why don't we just provide copies of any checks that were 
14 issued to the plaintiff in this case, and all the rest of the 
15 bank records, let's seal them, until the Court determines that 
16 they should be unsealed. 
17 I MR. FOSTER: We don't have possession of the bank 
18 records that had been subpoenaed. Counsel, Mr. Olsen, counsel 
19 for the defendant, has those records. He has refused to give 
20 J me copies of the records he got from Bank One, and he has 
21 refused to give me a copy of the subpoena that he gave to Bank 
22 One, which I find very curious. 
23 J We think, also, there is a serious issue of 
24 invalidity on the subpoenas. They were signed by a secretary. 
25 I She is not an officer of the court. We see that as a forgery. 
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1 We think the burden is on Mr. Olsen to sign his own subpoenas. 
2 We think if the secretary signs the subpoenas, they are of no 
3 force and effect. Therefore, we think we are before this Court 
4 concerning subpoenas that really, in effect, don't exist. 
5 THE COURT: Help the Court cut to the chase on this 
6 one. 
7 MR. FOSTER: If the Court will tell me — if the 
8 Court v/ill give me an attorney eyes only protective order, and 
9 will confine what we are to produce to precisely that — what 
10 he asked for in the subpoena to Terry Frank was all of the bank 
11 statements, all of the checks for four years. 
12 MR. OLSEN: I haven't asked that from Terry Frank. 
13 MR. FOSTER: Would you like me to get it out? 
14 MR. OLSEN: That's fine, yeah. 
15 MR. FOSTER: I would be very pleased to pull the 
16 subpoena. 
17 MR. OLSEN: To Bank One or to Terry Frank? 
18 MR. FOSTER: To Terry Frank. 
19 MR. OLSEN: I correct myself. One of the main issues 
20 here is the American Express account that Mr. Holt claims is 
21 being paid by Park City Pharmacy. All I asked for was copies 
22 of the checks paid on the American Express account from Park 
23 City Pharmacy for '93, '94 and '95. What's happening is they 
24 are using this American Express account as income. He charged 
25 $35,000 on his American Express account, and he alleges that's 
1 I not income. But he is using it for personal purposes. They 
2 are not business purposes. 
3 MR. FOSTER: We have to get back to the issue of 
4 running roughshod over the Rules of Civil Procedure and case 
5 law in trying to get to these records. Part of the Rules of 
6 Civil Procedure and a great deal of the case law we have cited 
7 to the Court has to do with protection of the rights of third 
8 parties. Terry Frank is not a party to this. I have no idea, 
9 J in all due respect, what these records are, I have never seen 
10 them. I am not trying to conceal anything. But I have tried 
11 cases all over this land, and I have never seen anybody not 
12 appropriately serve copies of subpoenas, not honor a motion for 
13 a protective order, and file a motion for attorney's fees, and 
14 file a motion to compel. Just mind-boggling. 
15 THE COURT: The Court is going to honor your 
16 position. Here is what the Court would like to do. 
17 MR. FOSTER: We will accommodate, reasonably, your 
18 Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Maybe it just is going to fall on deaf 
20 ears again. We have what appears to be a fairly routine 
21 domestic case that is generating a small forest of paper. 
22 Every time the parties come to court, every time they file a 
23 motion, every time they respond to a motion, money for this 
24 little family is going someplace else. 
25 MR. FOSTER: Mr. Terry Frank1s money. He is into it 
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1 I four or five grand. 
2 THE COURT: I just simply would appreciate it if 
3 counsel would help the Court to help you focus on the issues of 
4 this case, and unl ess it is different than hundreds of cases 
5 that this Court sees every year, that deal with questions of 
6 custody and visitation and support and fair division of assets 
7 and fair assumption of debt, I mean, there can only be so many 
8 twists and turns to this type of lawsuit. Let's get it 
9 resolved. I am asking counsel, as a courtesy to each other, 
10 and as an act of deference to the Court, to seal the records 
11 that are questionable in any way as having any bearing in this 
12 lawsuit. We will give you the protective order. And I want 
13 the records surrendered to the Court, and they will be under a 
14 protective order.s The Court believes that if the request is as 
15 it has been articulated, counsel should be entitled to receive 
16 copies of any checks from the plaintiff's employer to the 
17 plaintiff in a relevant period of time. 
18 MR. FOSTER: May I point out to the Court that the 
19 J subpoena to Bank One reads as follows. "All copies of 
20 statements and checks on account number such and such, Park 
21 City Pharmacy, for 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996. " So he already 
22 has the records. 
23 MR. OLSEN: These are from him, personally. 
24 MR. FOSTER: Are we orally modifying the subpoena to 
25 Terry Frank to his records, only, now? 
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1 MR. OLSEN: It says from Terry Frank, copies of all 
2 checks given by you, Terry Frank, to Clifford Holt. Mr. Holt 
3 is saying that Terry Frank has loaned him money. All we want 
4 is copies of those checks from Mr. Frank to Mr. Holt. 
5 MR. FOSTER: I need clarification. Because your 
6 subpoena reads copies of all checks given by you or entities in 
7 which you have an interest. Are you striking — 
8 MR. OLSEN: I have Park City Pharmacy. If there is 
9 I other entities, yes. 
10 MR. FOSTER: What's the scope? A minute ago you are 
11 telling me all you want are Terry Frank1s records. Now you 
12 seem to be saying you want his records and Park City Pharmacy 
13 records. 
14 MR. OLSEN: Any check he has signed to Cliff Holt. 
15 MR. FOSTER: Do you not have the bank records? 
16 MR. OLSEN: I do. 
17 MR. FOSTER: Why do we have to duplicate that? 
18 MR. OLSEN: You don't have to duplicate that. 
19 MR. FOSTER: You are going to strike in your 
20 subpoena — okay, Park City Pharmacy. You do have records from 
21 other financial institutions. 
2 2 MR. OLSEN: Do not. 
23 MR. FOSTER: That's not consistent with my 
24 understanding, that there was a subpoena not only to Park City 
25 Pharmacy but to one other -- one other entity. Some savings 
9 
1 savings and loan; is that correct? 
2 MR. OLSEN: I donft know what you are speaking of. I 
3 just want checks from Mr. Frank to Mr. Holt. That's all. Any 
4 check that he has signed. 
5 MR. FOSTER: So what you want from me, then, to make 
6 sure that I understand what's being sought, is any nonPark City 
7 Pharmacy check which has been signed by Terry Frank and is 
8 available to Cliff Holt. 
9 MR. OLSEN: Sure. That's all I want. 
10 THE COURT: Can you live with that? 
11 MR. FOSTER: I can live with it. But we request, 
12 your Honor, that we be awarded our attorney's fees for having 
13 to deal with this. This is not our problem. Self help was 
14 available. All this man had to do was behave reasonably, and 
15 J we would have cooperated. We are in litigation all the time. 
16 MR. OLSEN: I will address that. But there are other 
17 things that I have requested, also. He is saying that 
18 Mr. Frank loaned him money. If there are promissory notes, all 
19 I want is a copy of those promissory notes. I think that's 
20 fair and reasonable. 
21 MR. FOSTER: I don't want to get into duplication. I 
22 I would like — first of all, I would like to have a copy of all 
23 the bank records that you subpoenaed. And I would like you to 
24 send me a copy of the subpoena, too, that you have refused to 
25 send me up to this point. If you have already got promissory 
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1 notes, I don't want to be searching for the ones you already 
2 have. 
3 MR. 0LSEN: I donft have any. Can I have those? 
4 MR. FOSTER: If they exist. 
5 MR. OLSEN: If they don't exist, just tell me they 
6 don't exist. 
7 THE COURT: Anything else? 
8 MR. OLSEN: Copies of checks that have been paid by 
9 Mr. Frank or entities in which he has an interest to American 
10 Express. 
11 MR. FOSTER: I think we would object to that. I 
12 think that's — 
13 MR. OLSEN: On Mr. Holt's account. 
14 MR. FOSTER: Well beyond the scope of what's 
15 I relevant. 
16 THE COURT: He said only as it related to the 
17 plaintiff, not to that account. Only as it related to the 
18 plaintiff. The Court believes that's a reasonable request. 
19 J MR. OLSEN: The documents indicate, your Honor, that 
20 Mr. Holt is the owner of a membership at Jeremy Ranch Country 
21 Club and Golf Course. He is claiming that Park City Pharmacy 
22 owns the membership. All I have asked Mr. Frank is to show me 
23 a document that indicates that Park City Pharmacy owns that 
24 club membership. 
25 MR. FOSTER: Why doesn't he go to the club? 
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1 MR. OLSEN: I have been there. They say Mr. Holt 
2 owns i t. 
3 MR. FOSTER: Then you have your evidence. 
4 MR. OLSEN: That's the case, so be it. 
5 THE COURT: It is denied. The Court will not require 
6 the production of that evidence. 
7 MR. OLSEN: Any partnership agreement between 
8 Mr. Holt and Mr. Frank. 
9 MR. FOSTER: There are no partnership agreements. 
10 J One share of stock that's been issued, and that was issued to 
11 Terry Frank. That's the only outstanding item. 
12 MR. OLSEN: Employment agreements with Mr. Frank. 
13 MR. FOSTER: Not to my knowledge. 
14 MR. OLSEN: I have asked for a copy of benefits 
15 provided by Park City Pharmacy to Cliff Holt. 
16 MR. FOSTER: It is unlikely. This is a fairly 
17 informal kind of thing. 
18 MR. OLSEN: There aren't any, all you have to say is 
19 no. But if you do have them, you will give them to me; is that 
20 right? 
21 MR. FOSTER: Sure. 
22 MR. OLSEN: And, your Honor, I have the rest of the 
23 documents from other sources. So those are the only ones that 
24 I am speaking from Mr. Frank. 
25 MR. FOSTER: We would like copies of those documents 
12 
to the extent they involve any — Terry Frank in any way. if 
they have gone on a submarine subpoena, and they have popped 
these things out here, we haven1t been notified. We want to 
know what they are. We may want to file an after-the-fact 
protective order. 
THE COURT: Your request is ordered. The Court 
orders all those documents be duplicated and provided to 
counsel for the pharmacy by June 1. 
MS. SAUNDERS: May I also get copies of the checks 
that will be provided? I don't have them. I didn't want them 
until this was resolved. 
MR. FOSTER: I will see the plaintiff gets copies. 
MS. SAUNDERS: The ones that Mr. Olsen has in his 
possession. 
MR. OLSEN: There are a lot of checks. The Court has 
ordered me to deliver those to the Court. I will provide those 
to the Court. If they want to take them from the Court — 
MR. FOSTER: I don't want to make another trip up 
here to try to find out document — 
MR. OLSEN: All I have is the checks. You ordered 
they be sealed and delivered to the Court. I will do that. 
MR. FOSTER: I would like all the documents that he 
has that relate to Terry Frank. 
THE COURT: That's reasonable. The Court has so 
ordered. 
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1 MR- OLSEN: I will make them available for him to 
2 copy. 
3 THE COURT: Send them to him. 
4 MR. OLSEN: There are thousands. I can't make copies 
5 of all those. I will make them available for him to make 
6 copies. 
7 MR. FOSTER: I think you can. 
8 MR. OLSEN: Is the Court ordering I make copies, or 
9 make them available for him to make copies? 
10 MR. POSTER: I think he ordered you to make copies. 
11 MR. OLSEN: It cost me hundreds of dollars to make 
12 copies of those checks. 
13 THE COURT: You take all of the copies to a date and 
14 a time and a place certain. Counsel can come and look at every 
15 document. 
16 MR. OLSEN: Make copies of anything they want. I 
17 have no problem with that. 
18 THE COURT: I want that done before June 1. 
19 Anything else? 
20 MR. FOSTER: Just would like the Court to grant our 
21 attorney's fees. 
22 THE COURT: On your request for fees, Counsel, reduce 
23 the claim for fees to an affidavit. 
24 MR. FOSTER: It is of record. 
25 THE COURT: You have submitted an affidavit? 
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1 MR. POSTER: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: You responded to it? 
3 MR. OLSEN: I have. If I might speak to that. 
4 Counsel would lead the Court to believe that he was submarined. 
5 I might indicate, and I have put in my response, your Honor, we 
6 have documents that would indicate that Mr. Holt is the owner 
7 of Park City Pharmacy. As a result of those documents that 
8 I indicated that — and signed by him, written by him, that he is 
9 the owner of Park City Pharmacy, what we did is on March 11 of 
10 J 1996 copies of my subpoenas were delivered to opposing counsel. 
11 There was absolutely no objection that was filed on the Bank 
12 One subpoena. That subpoena went out to Bank One on March 11. 
13 Mr. Foster enters his appearance on March 28, three weeks after 
14 my subpoena went out to Mr. Holt. 
15 J Now, if Mr. Holt had a problem with my subpoena he 
16 I could have objected to that subpoena. It went out to Bank One. 
17 I received the document before Mr. Foster even came into this 
18 litigation. I didn't even know who Mr. Foster was. All I knew 
19 is I had documents that indicated Mr. Holt was the owner of 
20 J Park City Pharmacy. I provided those to the Court. I sent out 
21 that subpoena. Those documents came from Bank One. Then 
2 2 Mr. Foster enters his appearance, subsequent to my subpoena 
23 being sent out and the document being received from Bank One. 
24 Now, the problem is, your Honor, I sent and have 
25 served upon Mr. Frank a subpoena duces tecum and also a 
15 
1 subpoena for a deposition. Now, Mr. Foster indicates that he 
2 spoke with me, and I did speak with Mr. Foster. Mr. Foster 
3 indicated to me that Mr. Frank would absolutely not provide me 
4 my documents and would not show up at his deposition. In fact, 
5 your Honor, I had subpoenaed four individuals for depositions, 
6 and all four of those individuals just failed to show up. Now 
7 he is requesting, your Honor, attorney's fees. This is what I 
8 have from Mr. Foster. My total fees that I have requested from 
9 this Court are about $900. 
10 Now, Counsel would lead this Court to believe that my 
11 fees are inflated. Mr. Foster just stood and said his fees 
12 were $4,000. The Court has reviewed what my subpoena 
13 requested. He said that I didn't do it right, because I didnft 
14 serve the registered agent. In Mr. Frank!s affidavit, himself, 
15 J he doesn't indicate that Park City Pharmacy is a corporation. 
16 He says it is sole owner of Park City Pharmacy. That's in his 
17 affidavit. That's why the subpoena went to Mr. Frank. I 
18 served him the subpoena, requested the documents, in fact, had 
19 to do it twice. My subpoena goes out early February. They 
20 I can't find Mr. Frank for over a month. March 5, my subpoena 
21 comes back. Then I have to send it out again. 
2 2 Your Honor, what I have done is nothing more than 
23 what any other attorney would have done to try to protect Miss 
24 Holt. The allegations were that he owned Park City Pharmacy. 
25 I tried to get it through him, couldn't. Went to Bank One. My 
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1 Bank One subpoena was a good subpoena. There was nothing wrong 
2 with my subpoena. 
3 THE COURT: The Court is going to take the question 
4 of fees — I intend to wait until after the underlying 
5 litigation has been resolved to deal with the questions of fees 
6 and costs. 
7 MR. FOSTER: In response to the belated attempt to 
8 validate the subpoena to Bank One, I point out to the Court 
9 J that good protocol and reason is to make known to the 
10 J registered agent. Now, we do this all the time. Mr. Olsen 
11 knows the procedure. You pick up the phone, you call the 
12 corporations division, you say, "What information do you have 
13 in your files for Park City Pharmacy, Inc.?" "Inc." suggests 
14 J to any experienced lawyer that somewhere along the line there 
15 is a corporation. Had he done that, he would have immediately, 
16 with a 60-second phone call, known that Terry Prank was the 
17 agent for service of process, and the appropriate person to be 
18 served for the corporation. 
19 So he didn't do what any reasonable lawyer would do. 
20 He short-cutted it. His secretary signed the subpoenas, didn't 
21 make a due diligence investigation, and then tries to stick us 
22 with all of this work, and it is substantial, your Honor. But 
23 it is, to some extent, a matter of principle. What I told 
24 Mr. Olsen was that until we had resolved the issue of 
25 confidentiality and relevance raised by our motions to quash 
17 
1 and for protective order, we would not produce documents, and 
2 we would not permit Mr. Frank to be deposed, which is the 
3 ordinary course of business in this kind of thing. 
4 Mr. Olsen would like to make much about his February 
5 subpoena. If the Court will look at it, the Court will find 
6 that it has the wrong address on it. So it was discarded. 
7 They started over with another one in March, with the right 
8 address, and within a couple of weeks, two and a half weeks, it 
9 was served. I have gone over to the apothecary shop which is 
10 on South Temple, 10th East, hundreds of times. 80 percent of 
11 the time I walk in there, Mr. Frank is behind the counter. He 
12 is not hiding. He doesn't have an office. He doesn't sneak 
13 around. All you have to do is walk in there, eight out of ten 
14 days, and he is there, and there is no affidavit from his 
15 process server as to how many times he went or what he tried to 
16 do to serve Mr. Frank. There is a note saying Mr. Frank was on 
17 vacation. 
18 So I would submit that the subpoena process used by 
19 Defendant's counsel falls well short of normal protocol and 
20 normal rules. And the case law, concerning which we have 
21 recent citation, holds lawyers to very strict behavior in terms 
22 of how they proceed, when they exercise the subpoena power 
23 within their own offices, as opposed to the old way, of 
24 clerk-only subpoenas, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: The record will reflect your position. 
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1 The Court is going to take the question of fees and costs under 
2 advisement, and we will deal with it after the other issues 
3 have been resolved in the case. 
4 MR. 0LSEN: For the record, I will have those 
5 documents available May 28, at 2:00, at my office, for them. 
6 MR. FOSTER: I didn't understand that to be the 
7 Court's order. Didn't the Court order him to make a copy and 
8 give them to us? 
9 THE COURT: The Court ordered that he notify Counsel 
10 J where those documents were going to be available, and you can 
11 pick and choose whatever you want from them. 
12 MR. FOSTER: We are to go to his office and examine 
13 them? 
14 MR. OLSEN: Or someplace that's convenient. But I 
15 want everybody to know when and where that's going to occur. 
16 Is the date agreeable with everyone? 
17 MR. FOSTER: I don't have my calendar with me. 
18 MS. SAUNDERS: I am going to be in San Francisco on 
19 the 28th. 
20 THE COURT: Step outside when we are through, and the 
21 I three of you agree on a date, time and place for the documents 
22 to be inspected and/or copied, and include that in the order 
23 that reflects the ruling of the Court today. And counsel for 
24 the plaintiff will prepare the — counsel for the defendant 
25 will prepare the order. 
19 
1 Now, let me say one more time, out of an effort, a 
2 just compelling effort to get this case resolved, it does 
3 nothing except generate tremendous fees and costs in this 
4 lawsuit for people on both sides of this dispute to play the 
5 lawsuit close to the vest. Income is a critical question in 
6 this lawsuit, I want the parties to be candid with each other 
7 on what the historical income of these people were while they 
8 J lived together. I mean, it is simply not a case of having to 
9 J reinvent the wheel. And if there are efforts to the contrary, 
10 J I want the parties to cease and desist. Letfs just get on with 
11 I the question of what is going to be a fair award of child 
12 support, based on historical income of these parties, what is 
13 going to be a fair award of any other type of family or spousal 
14 support, based on the income of these parties. 
15 J I understand that the real thorny question is 
16 resolved, is it not, custody and visitation? 
17 MR. OLSEN: That is, 
18 I THE COURT: It is a money case. Let's not spend all 
19 I the money resolving a money case. I am here to please. 
20 MR. FOSTER: Would you object if I were excused? 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Clifford Holt vs. Audrey Holt, 954300067. 
3 Counsel will state an appearance. 
4 MR. OLSEN: Mitch Olsen appearing for and on behalf 
5 of the defendant, Miss Holt. 
6 MR. FOSTER: My name is Lynn Foster. I represent two 
7 third parties, your Honor, Terrance Frank, also known as Terry 
8 Frank; and Park City Pharmacy, a Utah corporation, doing 
9 business in Park City. 
10 THE COURT: Tell the Court what stipulation you have 
11 entered into thus far on the matters before the Court this 
12 morning. 
13 MR. FOSTER: There was no stipulation, your Honor, 
14 prior to the hearing. At this hearing, as I understand the 
15 matter, the Court, with the consent of counsel for the 
16 defendant and counsel for the third parties, has adopted the 
17 transcript of the hearing as the controlling order in this 
18 matter; and, therefore, the Court will not be required to 
19 decide as between the proposed order of the defendant and the 
20 proposed order of the third parties. 
21 THE COURT: So stipulate? 
22 MR. OLSEN: So stipulate. 
23 THE COURT: That's the order of the Court. What 
24 other matters are pending? 
25 MR. FOSTER: There are three other matters. One is a 
1 fairly minor matter. That concerns Mr. Olsen's untimely 
2 submission of an analysis of the transcript of the hearing, 
3 which we got by facsimile the day before yesterday, and 
4 yesterday in the mail. I have not looked at that. I have not 
5 had time to look at it. And there is no showing of excusable 
6 neglect as to why — where he had possession of the transcript 
7 weeks ago, that we should be bombarded at the last minute 
8 forcing us to choose between preparation for the hearing and 
9 reading of an additional memorandum. 
10 Now, putting that to one side — therefore, we 
11 request the Court not consider that submission. Putting that 
12 I to one side, there is simply two issues remaining. There is a 
13 request by Mr. Olsen for hearings fees against the third-party 
14 Frank, and there is a motion for sanctions by the third parties 
15 against the defendant and defendant's counsel. I would like to 
16 briefly argue that, if the Court will permit me to do so. And 
17 I don't think it will take a great length of time. 
18 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
19 MR. FOSTER: There are, essentially, two subpoenas at 
20 issue. May I approach the bench? 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 MR. FOSTER: The first subpoena in time is a records 
23 deposition document, coupled, I think, with a subpoena duces 
24 tecum. That's the third and fourth page. This is directed to 
25 Bank One, and it seeks "Any and all copies of statements and 
3 
checks on account number such and such Park City Pharmacy for 
1993, 1994 and 1995 and 1996. " Now, that is sweeping, and 
includes every document possessed by Bank One, which has --
which concerns Park City Pharmacy, a Utah corporation, the 
identification of which is readily available at the 
corporations division in the State. You will note — so thatfs 
unduly broad. It embraces far more material that's irrelevant 
than it embraces relevant material. The case law, which 
clearly holds that, per se, bank records are confidential. And 
we have cited that to the Court. 
The service, which was earlier argued by Mr. Olsen as 
having been perfected on Mr. Holt, in a representative capacity 
as an agent for Park City Pharmacy, was also a spurious 
argument. If you look at both certificates of service, they 
were by mail, and they were to counsel for Mr. Holt, the 
plaintiff, in his personal capacity. There is no evidence that 
there was ever any attempt to serve anyone in a representative 
capacity for Park City Pharmacy. 
The first we learned of this was after Mr. Holt's 
deposition, but we had prior to that point in time received 
notices of deposition and a subpoena to Mr. Frank personally, 
and it was not a 30(b)6 type of procedure, where that he sought 
Mr. Frank's records and any entity records in which Mr. Frank 
holds an interest. 
We believe — going back to this records deposition, 
4 
1 we believe that all of the documents which Mr, Olsen 
2 characterized as thousands at the last hearing, or next to last 
3 hearing, ignoring the one that was in open court, as opposed to 
4 the telephonic hearing, he had possession of those records, and 
5 we never had notice, 
6 We are here, your Honor, mostly, for the purpose of 
7 preserving and protecting the rights of third parties in 
8 litigation. Our position is really a four-prong position. 
9 There were initial errors made on behalf of the defendant in 
10 clear and improper violation of the Utah Rules of Civil 
11 Procedure to obtain these documents. They denied Park City 
12 Pharmacy, my client, an opportunity to be heard, by the way it 
13 was handled, in respect to whether we were going to produce 
14 these records, and, if so, which part of them would be 
15 relevant, and to have the opportunity to have them identified 
16 as confidential documents. 
17 After we received Mr. Frank1s subpoenas, I filed a 
18 motion for a protective order and to quash on the ground that 
19 we thought what was being sought from Mr. Frank should not 
20 include corporate records, should be limited to that which was 
21 relevant, and, in any event, anything produced should be 
22 produced under a secrecy order with the court. 
23 THE COURT: How did the Court rule on that? 
24 MR. FOSTER: And the Court did not rule on that. 
25 That was mooted, I think, your Honor, by reason of what 
5 
1 transpired before, in the hearing, because the Court said, 
2 well, notwithstanding the flaws in respect to Mr. Frank's 
3 notice of deposition and subpoena for documents, Mr, Foster, 
4 will you, as a courtesy to the Court, do the following things? 
5 And I said, yes, I will, your Honor. And I reported both to 
6 the Court, by letter, and to Mr. Olsen the results of that. I 
7 think that could be construed as a consent, as opposed to an 
8 order, but it doesn't make an awful lot of difference to me. I 
9 agreed to do it, and I did it. I think that mooted it. There 
10 was no offer made last time that Mr. Frank should sit for his 
11 deposition. 
12 And having filed the motion for protective order, we 
13 should not concern ourselves, your Honor, with the request for 
14 attorney's fees made by Mr. Olsen. His contention, 
15 essentially, is that, notwithstanding the motion for protective 
16 order, to quash, Mr. Frank should have shown up for his 
17 deposition, he should have produced the documents, and, because 
18 he didn't, the defendant should receive attorney's fees. 
19 Anyone familiar with the elemental practice on deposition and 
20 document discovery knows that a motion for protective order and 
21 to quash stays the discovery and stays the deposition, pending 
22 an order from the Court. 
23 And, furthermore, Mr. Olsen did not file a motion to 
24 compel under Rule 37. He just asked for attorney's fees. We 
25 think that's frivolous, and we should not have been bothered, 
1 have to deal with that. We are concerned, your Honor, not only 
2 about the initial mistakes by Counsel, we are far more 
3 concerned about the fact that there was a failure to cure, a 
4 failure to mitigate. There was a dogged refusal. We couldn!t 
5 get the subpoena directly from Mr. Olsen until about a week 
6 ago, on the Bank One thing. I asked for it. He refused to 
7 send it. 
8 Finally, I got a copy from Evelyn Saunders. Then I 
9 subpoenaed — or I asked for documents from Mr. Olsen, and 
10 finally got the subpoena last week, and we went merrily 
11 forward, offering no cooperation. I said, why don't we 
12 stipulate to a protective order, save the Court the time, and 
13 present that to the Court? He didn't have time to deal with 
14 it, because it was a divorce matter. So he leaves us out 
15 there, and doesn't tell us at this point in time he has got 
16 thousands of documents already from Bank One, concerning which 
17 Park City Pharmacy has never been served. We take the position 
18 that the subpoena to Bank One was invalid on its face, void ab 
19 initio, and he wrongfully is in possession. 
20 THE COURT: What would you like the Court to do this 
21 morning? 
22 MR. FOSTER: The Court already issued an order in the 
23 transcript. The Court — let me — 
24 THE COURT: Specifically, what relief are you seeking 
25 from the Court today? 
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1 MR, POSTER: Compliance. We have a man in contempt, 
2 comes here and says maybe I thought I should bring the 
3 documents. This is what the Court said. Transcript, page 8, 
4 lines 2, 9 and 11. "I am asking counsel to seal the records 
5 that are questionable." Talking Park City pharmacy records 
6 now. 
7 Then later, the Court, on page 8, lines 12 and 13, "I 
8 want the records surrendered to the Court.11 He hasn't 
9 surrendered them yet. Our position is he shouldn't have them. 
10 Then when we got downstream a ways, he said I want to 
11 keep a copy, copy of wrongfully obtained documents that have 
12 not been confidential. Now, he and I spoke on the phone, when 
13 he had possession of these documents, after he had used his 
14 submarine subpoena, without proper service, he did not tell me 
15 he had those documents. He then went forward at the deposition 
16 of Mr. Holt, and used some of these Bank One documents as 
17 exhibits in Mr. Holt's deposition, without ever telling us he 
18 had them, and without marking them confidential, at a point in 
19 time when we had filed our motion for protective order, saying 
20 Park City Pharmacy and Mr. Frank are very concerned about 
21 preserving the confidentiality of records. 
22 So we think -- we ordinarily would not be pursuing 
23 this matter, your Honor. Most lawyers that we would encounter, 
24 once we pointed out the problem, would, number one, stipulate 
25 I to a protective order, and it would be an easy thing, and it 
1 would not burden the Court. And if they had made errors, most 
2 descent lawyers that I know would say, "I am sorry." 
3 Apparently, in our haste, we overlooked that. What can we do 
4 to make it right? Instead of getting concealment, frivolous 
5 justifications, forcing us to go on and on and on. We still 
6 don't have a protective order, either from the Court or 
7 stipulation. We do have an order saying seal these documents 
8 up, and get them to the Court, and then I will decide what I 
9 want to do with them. 
10 THE COURT: Let's ask Counsel, so we can bring this 
11 hearing to a close, your response to that. We have other 
12 matters on the calendar we need to move through. 
13 MR. OLSEN: I will attempt to be brief, your Honor, 
14 but I think the C<?urt realizes that from day one we have been 
15 playing hide and seek in this divorce matter. In fact, the 
16 discovery file is larger than the divorce file. If the Court 
17 will look at the subpoena that's been provided for the Court 
18 this morning on Bank One, first of all, that subpoena was sent 
19 out long before Mr. Foster even entered an appearance as 
20 counsel for a third party. 
21 THE COURT: Let me ask a question, and see if we can 
22 short circuit the entire process. Do you have all the 
23 documents that are disputed by opposing counsel in your 
24 possession this morning? 
25 MR. OLSEN: I do. Your Honor, Mr. Foster, I 
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1 J believe --
2 THE COURT: Let me ask another question. 
3 MR. OLSEN: He ha3 indicated, I think, in his 
4 pleadings, that I have lied about the fact that there are over 
5 1,000 documents that I have. When somebody questions my 
6 integrity, I had my clerk count those documents, your Honor, 
7 and I would proffer to the Court that, with the checks, there 
8 are 4,828 documents. For that reason, if the Court looks 
9 carefully at the transcript, that the Court will note that 
10 after the Court ordered me to deliver those documents, the 
11 Court then said to make them available for copying by Counsel. 
12 Now, I have retained those documents, waiting for counsel to 
13 call to look at those documents, and to make copies of those 
14 documents. And, for that reason, I have the documents today, 
15 and I am delivering them to the Court. 
16 MR. FOSTER: No — 
17 THE COURT: Just a moment. I let both of you talk. 
18 Let me talk. 
19 MR. FOSTER: I apologize, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Both of you. I want to bring an end to 
21 this Holt v. Holt case. It has been hanging in the system for 
22 nearly two years. I understood that all the substantive issues 
23 in this lawsuit have been resolved. 
24 MR. OLSEN: They have. 
2 5 THE COURT: Why don't you take that box of records, 
10 
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1 and burn them? 
2 MR. OLSEN: I am happy to do whatever the Court wants 
3 I to do with them. 
4 THE COURT: That's my suggestion. Go recycle them. 
5 We have a bin down here that some tree-growing plant in Oregon 
6 wants us to recycle all of our papers. Why don't you stipulate 
7 there is not a copy in the world of those records, and the two 
8 of you go put them in the recycling bin, and let's be done of 
9 it? 
10 J MR. FOSTER: Making a statement somewhat corrective 
11 J of what was said. Opposing counsel said he didn't say 1,000. 
12 THE COURT: I don't want to keep saddling up and 
13 trying to ride this dead horse. 
14 MR. FOSTER: I understand. I haven't had a chance to 
15 look at these. The proposal I made was that they be delivered 
16 to me, and as a modification — 
17 THE COURT: You have them. If Counsel represents, as 
18 an officer of the court, that those records represent 
19 everything that was obtained pursuant to that subpoena in the 
20 Holt case, give him the box, let him carry them out of here, 
21 and you can do whatever you want with them. 
22 MR. FOSTER: Do we have a representation from Counsel 
23 that he has not retained any copies of anything that was 
24 subpoenaed from Bank One? 
25 MR. OLSEN: I will represent to the Court that I will 
11 
have my clerk run through every, single file that I have, and 
if the Court's order is to destroy those copies, I will have 
those copies destroyed, 
THE COURT: I accept that — 
MR, FOSTER: What about the exhibits to the 
deposition? 
MR, OLSEN: You can do whatever you want with the 
exhibits. If you want to call the reporter, do whatever you 
want. I don't care what you want to do with the exhibits. 
MR. FOSTER: You caused the problem. I would like 
you to cure it. I would like copies of whatever they were. I 
have asked — 
MR. OLSEN: He can get copies of the deposition. He 
can do anything he wants with that. He can destroy it, 
whatever he wants to do. I don't care what he does with it. 
The deposition has already been taken. It is there. Whatever 
he wants to do with it, so be it. 
THE COURT: Prepare an order, and I will instruct 
opposing counsel to sign it, and any documents that you want to 
remove, pursuant to your stipulation, that were involved in the 
deposition, take them, and do whatever you want with them. 
MR. FOSTER: We have a motion for sanctions. We are 
into it about eight grand now, your Honor, fighting for our 
client's right not to be abused in the course of discovery, and 
he has been. 
12 
1 THE COURT: As I recall, this case has represented a 
2 very acrimonious, cantankerous, long, drawn-out lawsuit, where 
3 there have been allegations and counter allegations of deceit 
4 and subterfuge and concealment and noncompliance and 
5 noncooperation, ad nauseam- Let's just leave it alone, and let 
6 both sides bear whatever costs you have incurred in pursuing it 
7 or defending it or counter defense and counter pursuit, and 
8 understand that the case is over now. 
9 MR, FOSTER: I take it that's a denial of our motion 
10 J for attorney's fees. 
11 THE COURT: It is. Make sure Counsel has every 
12 record in that box that the Court has ordered surrendered. The 
13 two of you enter into a stipulation that, pursuant to a signed 
14 order, that any other documents that have surfaced from that 
15 subpoena, you can do whatever you want with them. 
16 Anything further? 
17 MR. FOSTER: Your Honor, I gather that I am to 
18 prepare the order. 
19 THE COURT: Yes, prepare the order as it relates to 
20 the surrendering of the documents, and the removal, by 
21 stipulation of both counsel, of any documents that were used in 
22 the deposition. 
23 MR. OLSEN: I think we can stipulate now that the 
24 only document that will be removed from the deposition will be 
25 the checks that were acquired from Bank One. There will be no 
13 
1 I other documents that would be relevant. 
2 1 MR. FOSTER: The testimony would be relevant, your 
3 Honor. If he is testifying as to what this check means, when 
4 was it issued, so on, I don't know how you can eliminate the 
5 I check, and not eliminate the testimony. What I would just as 
6 I soon do is have the court reporter ordered to seal it. If the 
7 original has already been delivered to the Court, that the 
8 I Court's copy be sealed, subject to further order, 
9 THE COURT: Let's do that. If there is any reason to 
10 I reopen it, just make a motion to the Court. 
















C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, BRAD J, YOUNG, hereby certify that I attended and 
reported, as official court reporter, the proceedings in the 
above-entitled and numbered matter before the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian and that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription 
of my stenographic notes thereof. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of S6pt., 1996. 
R ASst 
BRAD J . jXO^NG 




Lynn G. Foster (#1105) F I L E D 
FOSTER & FOSTER L.C. 
602 East Third South CCf 1 -•;•'•. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 CIerAoi&-nn».'^ jncy 
3 y _ £ & 
Attorney for Third Parties Deputy O.* 
Terrance E. Frank and Park City Pharmacy, Inc. ^ _ . ._ ,, -SUMMTT COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD E. HOLT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AUDREY N. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 954300067DA 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
The Court, in the above-identified matter, heard arguments on 23 August 1996 at 
approximately 9:30 a.m. Mitchell J. Olsen was present representing the Defendant, Audrey N. 
Hoit and Lynn G. Foster was present representing third panies Terrance E. Frank and Park City 
Pharmacy, Inc., counsel for the Plaintiff was not present. Being fully advised in the premises 
and following full briefing and oral argument to the Court, the Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. Based upon the oral stipulation of counsel in open court, the transcript of the hearing 
in the above-identified matter which took place on May 16, 1996 shall constitute the 
Order as to the matters before the Court on May 16, 1996. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees is denied. 
BOOixVi u HAUL 1 8 ' / 
The Motion for sanctions by third parties Terrance E. Frank and Park City 
Pharmacy, Inc. is denied. 
Upon agreement of counsel, Defendant and Defendant's counsel were ordered to 
provide to the third parties all of the documents of Park City Pharmacy, Inc. and any 
copy thereof subpoenaed from Bank One by the Defendant, all of which were 
represented by counsel for the Defendant to be physically in the courtroom, 
following which Defendant's counsel delivered the same to counsel for the third 
parties. 
DATED this / o day of iJCL o <^2^3&96. 
BY THE COURT 
/ 
^ , ^ ( ^ 
Pat B. Brian 
Third Judicial District Coui 
sor^ O 
Approved as to form. 
Mitch&l J. Olsen 
Counsel for the Defendant 
Date: f<-*f^~~ S<^ <2 3, / V ft 
1 \C^Nry MS, O 
# 
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YOU AEE COMMANDED: 
[ ] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time 
specified below to testify in the above case. 
[ ] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the 
taking of a deposition in the above case. 
[ ] to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following docu-
ments or objects at the place, date and time specified below (list docu-
ments or objects): 
irt and a jury, Honorable 
having been duly tried and 
>ndant C. D. the sum of 
°f percent as pro-
e^ dismissed on the merits, 
ETA. B. his costs of action.] 
day of
 t i 9 _ 
:k of Court 
[ ] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time 
specified below. 
PLACE DATE AND TIME 
Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking 
of a deposition shall designate one or more ofiScers, directors, or managing 
agents, or other person who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, 
for each person designated, the matters on which the person will testify. Rule 
30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Go£ i 
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ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND TITLE DATE 
(INDICATE IF ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT) 
NOTICE TO PERSONS SERVED WITH A SUBPOENA 
Subpoena to Appear at Trial, at Hearing, or at Deposition 
1. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at trial or at 
hearing, you must appear in person at the place designated in the subpoena. 
2. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at deposition, 
you must appear in person at the place designated in the subpoena. If you are 
a resident of Utah, the subpoena may command you to appear only in the 
county where you reside, or where you are employed, or where you transact 
business in person, or where the court orders you to appear. If you are not a 
resident of Utah, the subpoena may command you to appear only in the 
county where you are served with the subpoena, or where the court orders. 
3. If this subpoena commands you to appear to give testimony at trial, at 
hearing, or at deposition, but does not command you to produce or to permit 
inspection and copying of documents or tangible things, or inspection of prem-
ises, you have the right to object if the subpoena: 
a. imposes an undue burden or expense upon you; 
b. does not allow you a reasonable time to comply, which may be less 
than 14 days, depending on the circumstances; or 
c. commands you to appear at deposition at a place in violation of 
paragraph 2, above. 
4. To object to complying with the subpoena, you must file with the court 
issuing the subpoena a motion to quash or modify the subpoena. You must 
comply with the subpoena unless you have obtained a court order granting 
you relief from the subpoena. 
Subpoena to Produce or to Permit Inspection of Documents or Tangible Things 
or to Permit Inspection of Premises 
5. If this subpoena commands you to produce or to permit inspection and 
copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, 
but does not command you to appear to give testimony at trial, at a hearing, 
or at a deposition: 
a. you need not appear in person at the place of production or inspec-
tion; 
b. you must produce documents as you keep them in the ordinary 
course of business or organize and label them to correspond with the 
categories demanded in the subpoena; and 
c. you need not make any copies or advance any costs for production, 
inspection or copying. If you agree to make copies, the party who ha3 
served the subpoena upon you must pay the reasonable costs of produc-
tion and copying. 
6. You have the right to object if the subpoena: 
a. imposes an undue burden or expense upon you; 
b. does not allow you at least 14 days to comply, unless the party 
serving the subpoena has obtained a court order requiring an earlier 
response; 
c. requires you to disclose a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development or commercial information; 
d. requires you to disclose privileged communication with your attor-
ney or privileged trial preparation materials; or 
e. requires you to disclose an unretained expert's opinion or informa-
tion not describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting 
from expert's study made not at the request of any party. 
7. To object to a subpoena for one of the reasons stated in paragraph 6, you 
must provide notice in writing of your objection to the party or attorney 
U u ^ . j 
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FLE DATE 
P F OR DEFENDANT) 
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ce any costs for production, 
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reasonable costs of produc-
na: 
upon you; 
) comply, unless the party 
order requiring an earlier 
other confidential research, 
lunication with your attor-
s; or 
Xpert's opinion or informa-
:es in dispute and resulting 
t of any party 
stated in paragraph 6, you 
i to the party or attorney 
gsrving the subpoena before the date specified in the subpoena for you to 
respond. If your objection ia baaed on either paragraph 6(c), 6(d), or 6(e), your 
written objection must describe the nature of the documents, coramunicationa 
or things that you object to producing with sufficient specificity to enable the 
party or attorney serving the subpoena to contest your objection. You must 
a^o comply with the subpoena to the extent that it commands production or 
mspection of materials to which you do not object. 
8. After you make timely written objection, the party who has served the 
subpoena upon you must obtain a court order to compel you to comply with the 
subpoena. The party must give you a copy of its motion for a court order and 
notice of any hearing before the court. You have the right to file a response to 
the motion with the court and a right to attend any hearing. After you make a 
timely written objection, you have no obligation to comply with the subpoena 
until the party serving the subpoena has served you with a court order that 
compels you to comply. 
9. If this subpoena commands you to produce or to permit inspection and 
copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, 
and to appear to give testimony at trial, at a hearing, or at a deposition, you 
may object to the production or inspection of documents or tangible things, or 
inspection of premises, by following the procedure identified in paragraph 7. 
Even though you object to production or inspection of documents or tangible 
things, or inspection of premises, you must appear in person at the trial, at the 
hearing or at the deposition unless you obtain an order of the court by follow-
ing the procedures identified in paragraph 4. 
Form 31. Notice of Execution, Exemptions and 
Right to a Hearing. 
IMPORTANT: YOUR PROPERTY MAY BE TAKEN TO PAY A CREDITOR. 
PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY. 
The attached Writ of Execution has been issued on request of a judgment 
creditor (the Plaintiff) who sued you and got a judgment against you. This 
means that land or personal property owned by you may be taken by the 
Plaintiff to pay the judgment against you. 
The law provides that certain property cannot be taken to pay judgments. 
Such property is said to be exempt. The following is a partial list of property 
that is or may be exempt: 
1 A homestead up to the amount allowed by law (see Utah Code, Section 
78-23-4 regarding the proper procedure to declare and file a homestead) 
2. A motor vehicle used in trade or business up to the amount allowed by 
law 
3. Tools of the trade up to the amount allowed by law 
4. Social Security Benefits 
5 Supplemental Security Income Benefits (SSI) 
6 Veterans' Benefits 
7 Unemployment Benefits 
8 Worker's Compensation Benefits 
9 Public Assistance (Welfare) 
10 Alimony or Child Support 
11. Certain Pensions 
12. Part of all of wages or other earnings from personal services 
13 Certain furnishings and appliances 
14. Certain musical instruments 
15 Certain heirlooms 
This is a partial list and other various property exemptions may be avail-
able under federal law or the Utah Exemption Statute. You may want to 
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paragraph also removes any confusion concern-
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and this paragraph imposes new requirements 
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inch). 
Paragraph (e) This paragraph, which is an 
addition to the rule, requires typed signature 
lines and signatures in permanent black or 
blue ink. 
Paragraph (0 The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that the clerk muat accept 
all papers for filing, even though they may vio-
late the rule, but the clerk may require counsel 
to substitute conforming for nonconforming pa-
pers. The clerk is given discretion to waive re-
quirements of the rule for parties who are not 
represented by counsel, for good cause shown, 
the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (c) 
of this rule are similar to Rule 10, F.RC.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
Cited. 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
While an exhibit may be considered aa a part 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
P2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 4, 13, 15, 
381/2 to 75, 307 to 312, 340 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. 
C.J.S. — 71 C J S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98, 
371 to 375, 418. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) S ignature . Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, 
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. 
Each paper shall s tate the signer's address and telephone number, if any. 
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be 
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being 
called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Represen ta t ions to court . By presenting a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary sup-
port or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, 
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information 
or belief. 
(c) Sanct ions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject 
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attor-
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 34 
neys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible 
for the violation. 
(1; How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be 
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe 
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be 
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented 
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such 
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, 
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appro-
priately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party 
prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees 
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circum-
stances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter 
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdi-
vision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause 
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for viola-
tion of this rule 3hall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of 
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject 
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist 
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order diracting payment to the movant of some or all of the 
reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of 
the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented 
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initia-
tive unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary 
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party 
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the con-
duct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis 
for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule 
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1997.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1997 
amendmen t conform state Rule 11 with fed-
eral Rule 11 One difference between the rules 
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible 
for violations by a member of the firm. Federal 
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) states* "Absent exceptional 
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly 
responsible for violations committed by its 
partners, associates, and employees." Under 
the federal rule, joint responsibility is pre-
sumed unless the judge determines not to im-
pose joint responsibility State Rule 11(c)(1)(A) 
provides "In appropriate circumstances, a law 
firm may be held jointly responsible for viola-
tions committed by its partners, members, and 
employees " Under the state rule, joint respon-
sibility is not presumed, and the judge may 
impose joint responsibility in appropriate cir-
cumstances What constitutes appropriate cir-
cumstances is left to the discretion of the judge, 
but might include: repeated violations, espe-
cially after earlier sanctions; firm-wide 
sanctionable practices; or a 3anctionable prac-
tice approved by a supervising attorney and 
committed by a subordinate. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment rewrote this rule 
Compiler 's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 11, F R C P 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption proceeding 
Amendment of complaint 
\opeals 
Nature of duty imposed 
Reasonable inquiry 
Sanctions not warranted 
\ idation 





In an adoption proceeding, the trial court 
properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions against at-
torney who failed to make reasonable inquiry 
,nto existing law, made allegations in the 
amended petition that were not well grounded 
in fact, failed to obtain a preplacement adop-
tive study or temporary placement order, failed 
to comply with the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children, knew or should have 
known the natural mother's consent was 
flawed, knew the natural father would not con-
sent to the adoption, and failed to make a rea-
sonable inquiry as to whether the natural fa-
tness parental nghts were terminable Giffen 
v R W L, 913 P 2d 761 (Utah Ct. App 1996) 
Amendment of complaint 
Amendment by an attorney of the facta 
stated m a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facta as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary 
Calderv Third Judicial Dist Court ex rel Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P 2d 168 
fl954) 
Appeals. 
After voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs, the 
rral court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce 
sanctions under this rule did not legally preju-
dice plaintiffs and there was no final appeal-
able order Barton v Utah Transit Auth , 872 
P 2d 1036 (Utah 1994) 
Nature of duty imposed. 
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public 
duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the 
attorney's private duty to represent a client's 
interest zealously Clark v Booth, 821 P2d 
1146 (Utah 199b 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Certification by an attorney "that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after a reasonable inquiry the com 
plaint is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law" does not require him to 
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion be-
fore filing a medical malpractice action 
Deschamps v Pulley, 784 P 2d 471 (Utah Ct 
App 1989) 
Under this rule, a party need not have 
reacned the correct conclusion, he need only 
nave made a reasonable inquiry Barnard v 
I tan State Bar, 857 P 2d 917 (Utah 1993) 
Because attorney's reading of the law as it 
existed when he commenced his action was at 
least plausible, sanctions under this rule were 
not warranted Barnard v Utah State Bar, 857 
P2d 917 (Utah 1993) 
Sanctions not warranted 
On motions to impose sanctions against 
plaintiff Utah State Bar filed by defendants 
engaged in practice of public adjusting and 
based on the grounds that (1) the original com-
plaint named as plaintiff the "Board of Com-
missioners of the Utah State Bar" instead of 
the 'Utah State Bar," (2) there were no facts to 
support the claim that one defendant was en-
gaged m public adjusting, and 3) there was no 
basis in the law to support the Bar's assertion 
in its original complaint that first-party ad-
justing constituted the unauthorized practice 
of law, motions were properly denied since the 
misnomer of plaintiff in the original complaint 
was a technical error which did not cause de-
fendants any prejudice and was corrected in 
the Bar's amended complaint, since Bar coun-
sel had evidence that defendants were engaged 
m public adjusting, and since law as to first-
party adjusting was unsettled Utah State Bar 
v Sorensen, 910 P 2d 1227 (Utah 1996) 
Violation. 
—Question of law 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola-
tion of this rule is a question of law Taylor v 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P2d 163 Utah Ct App. 
1989), Jeschke v Willis, 811 P2d 202 (Utah 
Ct App 1991) 
—Sanctions. 
This rule gives mal courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
the particular case. Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 
770 P 2d 163 OJtah Ct App 1989), Giffen v 
R W L , 913 P2d 761 (Utah Ct App 1996) 
Attaching the wrong document to a com-
plaint violated this rule because a reasonable 
inquiry would na\e revealed the mistake, 
award of attorney fees was appropnate because 
the error caused defendants to ncur legal ex-
pense in researching the validity of an irrele-
vant document and preparing a motion to dis-
miss based on i t Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 
770 P 2d 163 (Utan Ct App 1989) 
Award of costs and attorney fees was an ap-
propnate sanction for attempting *o go forward 
with a class action that, m light of the com-
plete resolution of the matter eleven months 
pnor, was "unconscionable and beyond rea-
son ' Schoney v Memorial Estates, Inc , 863 
P2d 59 (Utah Ct App 1993' 
—Standard 
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
ney where opposing parties conceded that no 
particular document was signed m violation of 
the rule, but simply argued tnat even if the 
attorney believed the case was well grounded 
when he filed the complaint, he should have 
known after he met with counsel for defen 
dant3 that the case could not go forward 
Jeschke v Willis, 81 i P 2d 202 I tan Ct App 
1991) 
Utah appellate courta should use the three-
standard approach *n reviewing a trial court's 
Rule 11 findings This approacn includes. (1) 
rev lewmg the trial court's findings of fact un-
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der the clearh erroneous standard, (2) review-
ing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal 
conclusions uncer the correction of error stan-
dard, and (3) reviewing the trial court's deter-
mination as to the type and amount of sanction 
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion 
standard Barnard v Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1992), Giffen v R W L , 913 P2d 761 
(Utah Ct App 1996) 
The determination of whether conduct vio-
lates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis 
Giffen v R W L , 913 P 2d 761 (Utah Ct App 
1996) 
Cited in Walker v Carlson, 740 P 2d 1372 
(Utah Ct App 1987), State v Perdue, 813 P 2d 
1201 (Utah Ct App 1991), Runensburger v 
Rimensburger, 841 P2d 709 (Utah Ct App 
1992), Crowther v Mower, 876 P 2d 876 (Utah 
Ct App 1994) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislate e Enactments — At 
torney's Fees 1989 Utah L Rev 342 
Bngham Young Law Review — Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation Enough Is 
Enough, 1981 B Y U L Rev 579 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B Y U L Rev 597 
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues — 
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion7 Thomas v 
Capital Security Services, Inc, 1989 B Y U L 
Rev 877 
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 
1991 B Y U L Rev 959 
Fines Under New FedeialCml Rule 11 The 
New Monetarv Sanctions for the "Stop-and-
Think Again" Rule, 1993 B Y U L Rev 879 
Am. JUT. 2d — 61A Am Jur 2d Pleading 
§§ 339 to 349 
C J S — 7 1 C J S Pleading §§ 339 to 366 
A-L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for cli-
ent, for malicious prosecution, 46 ALR. 4th 
249 
Inherent power of federal district court to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel m ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L R. Fed 789 
Comment Vote — General principles regard 
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 95 A.LJL Fed 
107 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for defamation, 95 ALR. Fed. 181 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A L R . Fed. 13 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for securities fraud, 97 A.L R. Fed 107 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for infliction of emotional distress, 98 
A L R Fed. 442 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, m anti-
trust actions, 99 A.LR. Fed. 573 
Procedural requirements for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 100 A L R Fed 556 
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 287 to 304 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim m the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs The service of a motion under 
tins rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court 
(1) If the court demes the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action, 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement 
(b) How presen ted . Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted m the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of 
granted, (7) failur 
these defenses sha 
ted No defense or 
defenses or objectic 
ing after the dema 
for relief to which 
pleading, he may a 
relief If, on a moti 
of the pleading to 
outside the plead 
motion shall be t 
provided in Rule 5 
present all mater 
(c) Motion for j 
but within such ti 
ment on the pleadi 
outside the pleadi 
motion shall be tr 
provided m Rule 5 
present all m a t e r 
(d) Preliminary 
subdivision (b) of t 
motion for judgme 
and determined b 
orders that the hea 
(e) Motion for * 
sive pleading is p 
reasonably be req 
more definite state 
tion shall point OL 
motion is granted 
after notice of the 
court may strike t 
order as it deems 
(f) Motion to s t 
pleading or, if no re-
made by a party ^ 
him, the court ma 
or any redundant 
(g) Consol ida t i 
rule may join with 
to him If a party r 
all defenses and ob 
raised by motion, 
defenses or objecti 
rule 
(h) Waiver of a 
he does not prese^ 
made no motion, r 
to state a claim up 
an indispensable p 
claim may also be 
for judgment on th 
whenever .t appea 
lacks jurisdiction c 
objection or defen^ 
Rule 15(bJ in the 
Tab 8 
70 
"est, the action may 
court upon motion 
2 substituted in the 
on shall be made as 
:e. When a public 
i, resigns, or other-
i maintained by or 
>r takes office, it is 
need for so contin-
•ule may be made 
essor of an officer 
ction of his prede-
be affected, unless 
ice of the applica-
ndered after death of 
effect of death, §§ 78-
defendant; capacity, 
parties, U.R.C.P. 20. 
» on appeal, Rule 38, 
ubstitute. 
d and his death was 
the court record, but 
a substitution of par-
cement of the 90-day 
3eek substitution, it 
court to dismiss the 
thjen, 547 P.2d 1336 
d a n t 
rt did not lose juris-
inveyed during pen-
m (c) continues liti-
ts to determinative 
nate by conveyance 
a series of endless 
Utah 559, 252 P.2d 
by change in par-
commencement of 
1 time after failure 
3, 13 A.L.R.3d 848. 
ieath certificate as 
iminal action, 21 
final abjudication 
:ting compensation 
fact, 33 A.L.R.3d 
nstallment sale of 
ial paper given in 
vision waiving, as 
»<i against seller, 
71 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
Conservator or guardian for an incompetent, 
priority and preference in appointment of, 65 
A.L.R.3d 991. 
Defamation action as surviving plaintiffs 
death, under 8tatute not specifically covering 
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272. 
Power of incompetent apouse'9 guardian or 
representative to aue for granting or vacation 
of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to 
make compromise or settlement in such auit, 
32 A.L.R.5th 673. 
Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party, 
filed under Rule 25(a il) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of 
party after death, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 816. 
Key Numbers. — Parties *» 59. 
PART V. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY. 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(2) I n s u r a n c e agreements- A party may obtain discovery of the exis-
tence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person 
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reim-
burse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning 
the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in 
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insur-
ance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement. 
(3) Tr ia l p r e p a r a t i o n : Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivi-
sion (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a show-
ing that the party seeking discovery ha3 substantial need of the materials 
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 
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In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has 
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concern-
ing the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon 
request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by 
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court 
order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a 
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, me-
chanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is 
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person mak-
ing it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(4) Tr ia l p repara t ion : Exper ts . Discovery of facts known and opin-
ions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Sub-
division (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: 
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other 
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to 
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance 
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify 
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by 
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such 
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an ex-
pert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not ex-
pected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) 
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(i) The court shall require tha t the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect 
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert, 
(c) Pro tec t ive o rders . Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) tha t the 
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(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7^  that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a re-
quest for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, 
except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to amy question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
(fy Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action, 
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a 
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by 
the attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has 
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on 
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are 
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters 
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after 
service of the motion. 
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Following the discover} conference, the court shall enter an order tenta-
tively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and 
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovers, if any and determin-
ing such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary 
for the proper management of discovery in the action An order may be altered 
or amended vvhenever justice so requires 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a disco\ery conference 
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery 
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16 
(g) Signing of discovery reques ts , r e sponses , and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented b\ an atcorne} shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, whose address shall be stated A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state 
his address The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is (1) 
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase m the cost of litigation, and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
discovery already had m the case, the amount m controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake m the litigation If a request, response, or objection 
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to 
it until it is signed 
If a certification is made m violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica-
tion, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a rea-
sonable attorney fee 
(h) Deposi t ion where action pend ing in ano the r state. Any party to an 
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person 
within this state, m the same manner and subject to the same conditions and 
limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided 
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further 
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the 
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court 
in the county where the deposition is being taken 
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Compiler's Notes — Thus rule corresponds 
to Rule 26 F R C P 
Cros8-References — Admissibility of evi 
dence § 78 21 3 U R C P 43(a) 
Continuance to permit discovery, U R C P 
56(f) 
Depositions upon oral examination, I R C P 
30(c) 
Depositions use in court proceedings 
I R C P 32 
Depositions *hen taken I R C P 30(a) 
Discover} procedures Rule 4 502 Rules of 
Judicial Administration 
Exclusion of deposition from evidence 
I R C P 32(b) 
Expert and other opinion testimony, U R E 
701 to 706 
Fee for filing notice of deposition concerning 
action m another state § 21 1 5 
Liability insurance, admissibility of U R.E 
411 
Motions evidence on by depositions 
I R C P 43(b) 
Privileges §§ 78 24 8 78-24-9 UR.E 501 et 
seq 
Summary judgment discover) supporting or 
opposing motion for I R C P 56(e) 
Terminate or limit examination, motion to, 
U R C P 30(d) 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of rule 
Appellate review 
—Denial of discovery request 




purpose of rule 




—Official information privilege 
Trial preparation 
—Discovery from state 
—Eminent domain 
—Insurance documents 
—Otherwise discoverable records 
—Subjective matters 
—Testimony of witness. 
Cited 
Applicability of ru le . 
The taking of depositions pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in 
an action to remove a public official from office 
for malfeasance pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 
6 State v Geurta, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P 2d 12 
(1961) 
Appellate review 
—Denial of d iscovery r e q u e s t . 
When denial of a discovery request is deter 
mined on review to have been in error, the bur 
den of demonstrating that the erroneous denial 
was not prejudicial la upon the party resisting 
discovery Askew v Hardrnan, 884 P 2d 1258 
(Utah Ct App 1994), cert granted, 892 P2d 
13 (Utah 1995) 
Privilege agains t self- incrimination. 
Privilege against self-incrimination may be 
asserted in civil discovery proceedings to re 
fuse to answer interrogatories, questions posed 
in depositions, demands for production of docu-
ments, and requests for admissions, however, 
to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party 
must show that the response sought to be com-
pelled might be incriminating First Fed Sav 
& Loan Ass'n v Schamanek, 684 P 2 d 1257 
(Utah 1984) 
Protective o rde r 
—Trade secrets 
Materials that are the subject of a protective 
order under Subdivision (c)(7) are not automat 
ically privileged for purposes of Exemption 4 of 
the federal Freedom of Information Act be 
cause the determination of whether documents 
contain trade secrets under Exemption 4 is to 
be made solely by applying the express exemp-
tion for trade secrets and confidential commer 
cial or financial information found in the ex 
°mption itself Anderson v Department of 
Health & Human Servs, 907 F 2d 936 (10th 
Cir 1990) 
—Waiver 
Inaction and delay in filing a motion for pro-
tection with respect to documents alleged to be 
work product waives whatever right a defen-
dant may have been able to assert Moreover a 
defendant's failure to demonstrate any dili-
gence whatsoever in asser^ng the privilege is 
itself a waiver Gold Standard Inc / Amen 
can Barrick Resources Corp 805 P 2d 164 
(Utah 1990) 
P u r p o s e of rule. 
The purposes of discovers rules are to make 
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by 
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities, 
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery 
so that the parties and the court can determine 
the facta and resolve the ^ssues as directly, 
fairly and expeditiously as possible Ellis v 
Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189 429 P 2d 39 (1967) 
Scope of d iscovery 
—In generaL 
Discovery should be liberally permitted 
where it is used in eliminating non-controver-
sial matters and in identifying, narrowing and 
clarifying the issues on which contest may 
prove to be necessary State ex rel Rd Comm'n 
v Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P 2d 914 (1966) 
The use of discovery should not be extended 
to permit ferreting undulv into detail, nor to 
have the effect of cross examining the opposing 
party or his witnesses, nor should it be dis-
torted into a "fishing expedition " State ex rel 
Rd Comm'n v Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382,412 P 2d 
914 (1966) 
Relevance. 
The ultimate objective of any lawsuit is a 
determination of the dispute between the par-
ties, and whatever helps to attain that objec-
tive is "relevant" to the lawsuit Ellis v Gil-
bert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P 2d 39 (1967) 
—Insurance agreements . 
Defendant in personal injury action had to 
answer in discovery procedure whether he was 
insured and name of any insurer and amount 
of coverage, scope of inquiry as defined in 
phrase "the subject m a t e r of the action" al-
lowed questions pertaining to prospect of actu-
ally recovering damages as against contention 
that discovery in question was unwarranted 
intrusion into private affairs Ellis v Gilbert, 
19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P-2d 39 (1967) 
—Official information privilege 
Police department personnel and internal af-
fairs files are within tbe scope of discovery but 
the trial court is required to balance the com 
petmg interests through an in camera exami-
nat on of the materials ror which the official 
nformation privilege ~s claimed Madsen v 
United Television, Inc 801 P 2d 912 (Utah 
1990) 
Trial p repa ra t ion 
For written materials to fall under the pro-
tection of Subdivision (b)(3), three criteria 
must be met the material must be (1) docu-
ments and tangible things otherwise discover 
able (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or ror trial, (3) by or for another party or by or 
for that party's representative Gold Standard, 
Inc v American Bamck Resources Corp , 805 
P 2d 164 (Utah 1990^ 
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—Discovery from state. 
One of the special circumstances which the 
court may consider in determining whether to 
permit discovery of materials prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation is that the party from 
which discovery is sought is the state; defen-
dant in eminent domain action could properly 
discover names and addresses of state wit-
nesses and state's appraisal of value of land 
and improvements to be taken, but not value of 
underground pipe installations on state land 
and what plaintiff considered to be highest and 
best use of defendant's property. State ex rel. 
Road Comxn'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 
P.2d 914 (1966). 
—Eminent domain. 
A condemnor's appraisal report in eminent 
domain cases is subject to pretrial discovery, 
and does not lie within the aegis of the attor-
ney's work-product immunity. Utah DOT v. 
Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979). 
—Insurance documents. 
Documents in an insurance claim file may be 
protected as work product; however, whether a 
document prepared by an insurer is prepared 
in anticipation of litigation is a question of fact 
to be determined by the trial court on a case-
by-case basis. Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 
469 (Utah 1996). 
In determining whether documents in an in-
surance claim file were prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation, the trial court should con-
sider the nature of the requested documents, 
the reason the documents were prepared, the 
relationship between the preparer of the docu-
ment and the party seeking its protection from 
discovery, the relationship between the litigat-
ing parties, and other relevant facts. Askew v. 
Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996). 
—Otherwise discoverable records. 
Claim of privileged communication as to 
records given to attorney, based on generaliza-
tion that litigation was anticipated from the 
day records were started, did not provide 
grounds for barring otherwise justified discov-
ery of records. Jackson v. Kennecott Copper 
Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 1254 (1972). 
Attorney involvement is only one factor to be 
weighed in determining whether material was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources 
Corp., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990). 
A letter prepared because of a threatened 
suit outlining a retainer agreement and set-
ting up a plan for allocating costs and burdens 
among the clients in the event of litigation, but 
"which did not contain any legal strategies, the-
ories, or conclusions of the clients or their at-
torneys, was not work product, nor was it pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources 
Corp., 801 P.2d 909 (Utah 1990). 
—Subjective matters. 
Prohibition in former Rule 30(b> against dis-
covery of "any part of the writing uiat reflects 
an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories, or, except as pro-
vided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert" 
dealt only with subjective matters, not with 
evidence of objective facts, that is, occurrences, 
conditions and circumstances. Mower v. Mc-
Carthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952). 
Provision prohibiting discovery of attorneys 
"mental impressions, conclusions, [etc]" was 
absolute and prohibited discovery of such mat-
ters in all cases; trial court erred in ordering 
discovery upon showing of undue prejudice, 
hardship or injustice. Mower v. McCarthy, 122 
Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952). 
—Testimony of witness. 
Where plaintiff in wrongful death action 
sought transcript of testimony of witnesses to 
fatal accident, given by them to defense coun-
sel in preparation for litigation, there was ade-
quate showing of undue prejudice, hardahip 
and injustice to plaintiff if transcript was not 
produced, since it appeared that transcript pro-
vided the only source of information contained 
in it, that plaintiff had used due diligence in 
seeking to obtain such information in other 
ways, and that matter in transcript was not 
privileged; therefore, production was ordered, 
notwithstanding that transcript was part of de-
fense counsel's "work product." Mower v. Mc-
Carthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952). 
Cited in Jensen v. Thomas, 570 PJ2d 695 
(Utah 1977); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 
P.2d 525 (Utah Ct App. 1990); Berrett v. 
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Benson ex rel. Benson v. I.H.C. 
Hosps., 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Discovery of Liability 
Insurance Permitted by Rule 26(b) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 436. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is 
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597. 
A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial 
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Miscon-
duct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of 
the Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 793. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 12 to 14. 
C J . S . — 27 CJ.S. Discovery §§ 20 to 23, 63. 
A.L.R. — RijLrht of party to have his attorney 
or physician, or a court reporter, present dur-
ing his physical or mental examination by a 
court-appointed expert, 7 A.L.R.3d 881. 
Timeliness of application for compulsory 
physical examination of injured party in per-
sonal injury action, 9 A.L.R.3d 1146. 
Pretrial examination or discovery to ascer-
tain from defendant in action for injury, death, 
or damages, existence and amount of liability 
insurance and insurer's identity, 13 A.L.R.3d 
822. 
Medical malpractice action, scope of defen-
dant's duty of pretrial discovery in, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1446. 
Disclosure of name, identity, address, occu-
pation, or business of client as violation of at-
torney-client privilege, 16 A.L.R.3d 1047. 
Compelling party to disc: 
hands of affiliated or subsid 
independent contractor, not 
19 A.L.R.3d 1134. 
Physician-patient privile* 
tion involving physical cone 
decedent as waiving, as to 
ings, 21 A.L.R.3d 912. 
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deposition or serving inter 
case as, 23 A.L.R.3d 389. 
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proceedings to pretrial dep 
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at trial, 36 A.L.R.3d 1367. 
Patient's statements or de 
sibility of physician's testir 
than res gestae, during mec_ 
37 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Privilege against self-: 
ground for refusal to produce 
uments in possession of pers 
lege but owned by another, 
Discovery, in medical mal 
names of other patients to w: 
given treatment similar to th 
ing plaintiff, 74 A.L.R.3d 1 
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evidence or testimony in sub-
tween parties originally repr 
raneoualy by same attorney, 
communication to or fror 
A.LJR.4th 765. 
Physician-patient privilege 
patient's medical or hosp 
A.LJR.4th 552. 
Propriety of discovery ordt 
structive testing" of chattel 
AL.R.4th 1245. 
Refusal of defendant in "p-
case to identify claimed sour 
sumption against existenc 
A.LiUth 919. 
Absent or unnamed class 
action in state court as subjec 
A.LiUth 986. 
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l t as violation of at-
6 A.L.R.3d 1047. 
Compelling party to disclose information in 
handa of affiliated or aubaidiary corporation, or 
independent contractor, not made party to suit, 
19 A.L.R.3d 1134. 
Physician-patient privilege, commencing ac-
tion involving physical condition of plaintiff or 
decedent aa waiving, aa to diacovery proceed-
ings, 21 A.L.R.3d 912. 
Waiver of incompetency of witness, taking 
deposition or serving interrogatories in civil 
case as, 23 A.L.R.3d 389. 
Libel and slander application of privilege at-
tending statements made in course of judicial 
proceedings to pretrial deposition and discov-
ery procedures, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172. 
Physician-patient privilege, pretrial testi-
mony or diacloaure on diacovery by party to 
personal injury action aa to nature of injuries 
or treatment as waiver of, 25 A.L.R.3d 1401. 
Right of defendant in personal injury action 
to designate physician to conduct medical ex-
amination of plaintiff, 33 AJLR.3d 1012. 
Dead man's statute, personal representa-
tive's loaa of rights under, by prior institution 
of discovery proceedings, 35 A.L.R.3d 955. 
Assertion of privilege in pretrial discovery 
proceedings aa precluding waiver of privilege 
at trial, 36 A.L.K3d 1367. 
Patient's statements or declarations, admis-
sibility of physician's testimony as to, other 
than res gestae, during medical examinations, 
37 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Privilege against self-incrimination as 
ground for refusal to produce noncorporate doc-
uments in possession of person asserting privi-
lege but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Discovery, in medical malpractice action, of 
names of other patients to whom defendant has 
given treatment aimilar to that allegedly injur-
ing plaintiff, 74 A.L.R.3d 1055. 
Applicability of attorney-client privilege to 
evidence or testimony in subsequent action be-
tween parties originally represented contempo-
raneously by same attorney, with reference to 
communication to or from one party, 4 
A .L iUth 765. 
Physician-patient privilege aa extending to 
patient's medical or hospital records, 10 
AX.R.4th 552. 
Propriety of discovery order permitting "de-
structive testing" of chattel in civil case, 11 
A.L.R.4th 1245. 
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel 
case to identify claimed sources as raising pre-
sumption against existence of source, 19 
A.L.R.4th 919. 
Absent or unnamed class members in class 
action in 3tate court as subject to discovery, 28 
A.L.R.4th 986. 
Necessity of determination or showing of lia-
bility for punitive damagea before discovery or 
reception of evidence of defendant's wealth, 32 
A.L.R.4th 432. 
Abuse of process action baaed on misuse of 
discovery or deposition procedures after com-
mencement of civil action without seizure of 
person or property, 33 A.L.R.4th 650. 
Protective orders limiting diasemination of 
financial information obtained by depoaition or 
discovery in state civil actions, 43 A.L.R.4th 
121. 
Right of independent expert to refuse to tes-
tify as to expert opinion, 50 A.LJR.4th 680. 
Discovery: right to ex parte interview with 
injured party's treating physician, 50 
A.LJUth 714. 
Discovery of defendant's sales, earnings, or 
profits on issue of punitive damagea in tort ac-
tion, 54 A.L.R.4th 998. 
Discovery of identity of blood donor, 56 
A.LiUth 755. 
Propriety of allowing state court civil liti-
gant to call expert witness whose name or ad-
dress was not disclosed during pretrial discov-
ery proceedings, 58 A.L.R.4th 653. 
Discovery, in civil proceeding, of records of 
criminal investigation by state grand jury, 69 
A.LS.4th 298. 
Discovery of trade secret in state court ac-
tion, 75 A.L.R.4th 1009. 
Propriety and extent of state court protective 
order restricting party's right to disclose dis-
covered information to others engaged in simi-
lar litigation, 83 A .L iUth 987. 
Discoverability of traffic accident reports 
and derivative information, 84 A.L.R.4th 15. 
AJL.R. — State statutes or regulations ex-
pressly governing disclosure of fact that person 
has tested positive for human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) or acquired immunodefi-
ciency syndrome (ADDS), 12 AXJR.5th 149. 
Restriction on dissemination of information 
obtained through pretrial discovery proceed-
ings as violating Federal Constitution's First 
Amendment — federal cases, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 
471. 
Protection from discovery of attorney's opin-
ion work product under Rule 26(b)(3), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 779. 
Modification of protective order entered pur-
suant to Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 538. 
Academic peer review privilege in federal 
court, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 691. 
Key Numbers. — Discovery *» 28, 31, 33, 
67. 
Rule 27. Depositions before action or pending appeal. 
(a) Before action. 
(1) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or 
that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in 
any court of this state may file a verified petition in the district court of 
the county in which any expected adverse party may reside. 
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall 
show: (1) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable 
Tab 9 
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(c) Disqualification for interest. No deposition shall be taken before a 
person who is a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the 
parties, or is a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or is finan-
cially interested in the action. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 28, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Oaths, who may ad-
minister, § 78-24-16. 
Subpoena of person 
U.R.C.P. 45(d)(3). 
in foreign country, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Foreign countries. 
—Depositions as evidence. 
Foreign countries. 
—Depositions as evidence. 
In action for workmen's compensation 
brought by mother of deceased employee as his 
alleged dependent, depositions of testimony of 
nonparties, taken in foreign country without 
notice, stipulation, or order authorizing them, 
there being no appearance by employer at tak-
ing of depositions, and no opportunity for cross-
examination, amounted to no more than ex 
parte affidavits, and were not competent evi-
dence. Robles v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Utah 
408, 296 P. 600 (1931). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 23 Am, Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 15 to 20. 
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Depositions §§ 17 to 19. 
A.L.R. — Disqualification of attorney, other-
wise qualified, to take oath or acknowledgment 
from client. 21 A.L.R.3d 483. 
Use, in federal criminal prosecution, of depo-
sition of absent witness taken in foreign coun-
try, as affected by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 15(b) and (d) requiring presence of 
accused and that deposition be taken in man-
ner provided in civil actions, 105 AXit Fed. 
537. 
Key Numbers. — Depositions *=» 49, 50, 53. 
Rule 29, Stipulations regarding discovery procedure. 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation 
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any 
time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken 
may be used like other depositions, and 
(2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for other methods of 
discovery. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 29, F.R.C.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions Videotape, use to take deposition for presen-
and Discovery § 11. tation at civil trial in state court, 66 A.L.R.3d 
C.J.S. — 26A CJ.S. Depositions § 105. 637. 
A.L.R. — Incompetency, taking deposition Key Numbers. — Depositions ^» 111. 
or serving interrogatories in civil case as 
waiver of, 23 A.L.R.3d 389. 
Rule 30. Depositions upon oral examination. 
(a) When depositions may be taken. After commencement of the action, 
any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposi-
tion upon oral examination. Leave of court, granted with or without notice, 
must be obtained only if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the 
expiration of 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon any 
defendant or service made under Rule 4(e), except that leave is not required 
(1) if a defendant has served a notice of taking deposition or otherwise sought 
discovery, or (2) if special notice is given as provided in Subdivision (b)(2) of 
this rule. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as pro-
vided in Rule 45. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken 
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. 
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(b) Notice of examina t ion ; genera l requi rements ; specia l notice; non-
s tenograph ic record ing ; p roduc t ion of documents a n d things; deposi-
tion of organizat ion; depos i t ion by telephone. 
(1) A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral 
examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party 
to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the 
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if 
known, and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to 
identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. If a 
subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be examined, the 
designation of the materials to be produced as set forth in the subpoena 
shall be attached to or included in the notice. 
(2) Leave of court is not required for the taking of a deposition by 
plaintiff if the notice (A) states that the person to be examined is about to 
go out of the district where the action is pending and more than 100 miles 
from the place of trial , or is about to go out of the United States, or is 
bound on a voyage to sea, and will be unavailable for examination unless 
his deposition is taken before expiration of the 30-day period, and (B) sets 
forth facts to support the statement. The plaintiffs attorney shall sign the 
notice, and his signature constitutes a certification by him that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief the statement and supporting 
facts are true. The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are applicable to the 
certification. 
If a party shows that when he was served with notice under this Subdi-
vision (b)(2) he was unable through the exercise of diligence to obtain 
counsel to represent him at the taking of the deposition, the deposition 
may not be used against him. 
(3) The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time for 
taking the deposition. 
(4) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion 
order that the testimony at a deposition be recorded by other than steno-
graphic means. The stipulation or order shall designate the person before 
whom the deposition shall be taken and the manner of recording, preserv-
ing, and filing the deposition and may include other provisions to assure 
that the recorded testimony will be accurate and trustworthy. A party 
may arrange to have a stenographic transcription made at his own ex-
pense. Any objections under Subdivision (c), any changes made by the 
witness, his signature identifying the deposition as his own or the state-
ment of the officer that is required if the witness does not sign, as pro-
vided in Subdivision (e), and the certification of the officer required by 
Subdivision (f) shall be set forth in a writing to accompany a deposition 
recorded by nonstenographic means. 
(5) The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by a request 
made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production of documents and 
tangible things at the taking of the deposition. The procedure of Rule 34 
shall apply to the request. 
(6) A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a 
public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a govern-
mental agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on 
which examination is requested. In that event, the organization so named 
shall designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other 
persons who consent to testify on its behalf and may set forth, for each 
person designated, the matters on which he will testify. A subpoena shall 
advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make such a designation. 
The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably 
available to the organization. This Subdivision (b)(6) does not preclude 
taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules. 
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(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion 
order that a deposition be taken by telephone. For the purposes of this 
rule and Rules 28(a), 37(b)(1), and 45(d), a deposition taken by telephone 
is taken at the place where the deponent is to answer questions pro-
pounded to him. 
(c) E x a m i n a t i o n a n d cross-examinat ion; r e c o r d of examination; oath; 
object ions. Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as 
permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witnesses on 
oath and shall personally or by someone acting under his direction and in his 
presence record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be taken 
stenographically or recorded by any other means ordered in accordance with 
Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If requested by one of the parties, the testimony 
shall be transcribed. All objections made at the time of the examination to the 
qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, to the manner of taking it, 
to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party and any other objec-
tion to the proceedings shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. 
Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of partici-
pating in the oral examination, parties may serve written questions in a 
sealed envelope on the party taking the deposition, and he shall transmit 
them to the officer, who shall propound them to the witness and record the 
answers verbatim. 
(d) Mot ion to t e rmina t e or limit examina t ion . At any time during the 
taking of the deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and upon a 
showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such 
manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or 
party, the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district 
where the deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the 
examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the 
scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). If 
the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter 
only upon the order of the court in which the action is pending. Upon demand 
of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be sus-
pended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order. The provisions of 
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the mo-
tion. 
(e) Submiss ion to witness; changes ; s igning. When the testimony is 
fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examina-
tion and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and reading are 
waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance 
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the 
officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. 
The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by 
stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses 
to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its 
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of 
the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal 
to sign together with the reason, if any, given therefore; and the deposition 
may then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress 
under Rule 32(c)(4) the court holds that the reasons given for the refasal to 
sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part. 
(f) Reco rd of deposi t ion; cert if ication a n d delivery by officer; ex-
hibi ts ; copies . 
(1) The transcript or other recording of the deposition made in accor-
dance with this rule shall be the record of the deposition. The officer shall 
sign a certificate, to accompany the record of the deposition, that it was 
duly sworn and that it is a true record of the testimony given by the 
witness. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the officer shall securely 
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seal the record of the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the title of 
the action and marked "Deposition of [here insert name of witness]" and 
shall promptly send the sealed record of the deposition to the attorney 
who arranged for the transcript or other record to be made. If any party in 
the action is not represented by an attorney, the record of the deposition 
shall be sent to the clerk of the court for filing unless otherwise ordered 
by the court. An attorney receiving the record of the deposition shall store 
it under conditions that will protect it against loss, destruction, tamper-
ing, or deterioration. 
(2) Documents and things produced for inspection during the examina-
tion of the witness shall, upon the request of a party, be marked for 
identification and annexed to the record of the deposition and may be 
inspected and copied by any party, except that if the person producing the 
materials desires to retain them that person may (A) offer copies to be 
marked for identification and annexed to the record of the deposition and 
to serve thereafter as originals, if the person affords to all parties fair 
opportunity to verify the copies by comparison with the originals, or (B) 
offer the originals to be marked for identification, after giving to each 
party an opportunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the origi-
nals may be used in the same manner as if annexed to the record of the 
deposition. Any party may move for an order that the originals be an-
nexed to and returned with the record of the deposition to the court, 
pending final disposition of the case. 
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed by the parties, the 
officer shall retain stenographic notes of any depositions taken steno-
graphically or a copy of the recording of any deposition taken by another 
method. Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall 
furnish a copy of the record of the deposition to any party or to the depon-
ent. 
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses. 
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to 
attend and proceed therewith and another party attends in person or by 
attorney pursuant to the notice, the court may order the party giving the 
notice to pay to such other party the reasonable expenses incurred by him 
and his attorney in attending, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(2) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition of a 
witness fails to serve a subpoena upon him and the witness because of 
such failure does not attend, and if another party attends in person or by 
attorney because he expects the deposition of that witness to be taken, the 
court may order the party giving the notice to pay to such other party the 
reasonable expenses incurred by him and his attorney in attending, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The princi-
pal purpose of the 1994 revisions to paragraph 
(f) is to harmonize this rule with the Code of 
Judicial Administration and the practice in the 
courta relating to the riling of deposition tran-
scripts. Under the revised rule, the officer be-
fore whom the deposition is taken must send 
the sealed record of the deposition to the attor-
ney who arranged for the record to the made, 
instead of filing it with the court. If any of the 
parties to the case is not represented by an 
attorney, the record must be sent to the clerk of 
the court in which the case is pending. In all 
cases, the court may direct the parties and the 
officer to make other arrangements for the 
3afe-keeping of the deposition record. 
„A />f fhe 1994 revisions is to 
clarify the terminology used to designate the 
record of deposition testimony. The word 
"record" replaces the word "deposition" and in-
cludes transcripts. Since testimony may be re-
corded by written transcript, video-tape and 
possibly other means allowed by the court, the 
word "record** generally refers to any such 
record of deposition testimony. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1995, corrected the 
citation near the end of Subdivision (e) and re-
wrote Subdivision (f). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 30, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Commencement of 
action, U.R.C.P. 3. 
Court reporters and stenographers, § 78-56-
1.1 et seq. 
Rule 30 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 84 
Depositions before action or pending appeal, 
U.R.C.P. 27. 
Filing with the court defined, U.R.C.P. 5(e). 
Motions, orders and other papers, U.R.C.P. 
7(b). 
Partnership defined, § 48-1-3. 
Protective orders, U.R.C.P. 26(c). 
Scope of cross-examination, UJl.E. 611(b). 
Stipulations regarding discovery procedure, 
U.R.C.P. 29. 
Transcript of testimony at trial or hearing as 
evidence, U.R.C.P. 80(c). 
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Objection to deposition based on insuffi-
ciency of authentication by officer taking it 
must be made by motion to suppress before 
trial of cause. Groot v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 
34 Utah 152, 96 P. 1019 (1908). 
Changes to deposition. 
Although changes in depositions may be lib-
erally allowed, the technical requirements of 
Subdivision (e) that the deponent provide rea-
sons for the changes must be strictly applied. 
However, striking the changes is an extreme 
remedy and should be used sparingly. A court 
may instead permit the deponent opportunity 
to comply. Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Compelling appearance. 
To obtain presence of witness for purpose of 
taking his deposition, notice and affidavit pre-
scribed by former rule had to be served on ad-
verse party a attorney; if witness did not volun-
tarily appear, officer before whom deposition 
was to be taken had to issue subpoena. Com-
mand to witness to appear contained in notice 
or affidavit was ineffective. Olson v. District 
Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P.2d 529, 112 A.L.R. 
438 (1937). 
Privilege against self-incrimiiiation. 
Privilege against self-incrimination may be 
asserted in civil discovery proceedings, includ-
ing the taking of depositions; however, to sus-
tain an assertion of the privilege, a party must 
show that the responses sought to be compelled 
might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 
1984). 
Sealed depositions. 
The sealing provision of Subdivision (f)(1) is 
not a mandate for secrecy, but rather is to safe-
guard the integrity of depositions. Carter v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 
1990). 
Sealed pretrial depositions that are filed 
with a court are presumptively public under 
the Utah Public and Private Writings Act (for-
mer § 78-26-1 et seq.; see now Title S3, Chap-
ter 2) absent a showing of good cause as to why 
they should be kept secret. Carter v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990). 
When taken, 
—Action to remove city officer. 
Action to remove city commissioner for mal-
feasance in office is special statutory action to 
which Rules of Civil Procedure apply and tak-
ing of depositions is permitted; where court re-
jected commissioner's request to take deposi-
tions of witnesses, because he had been fur-
nished full information, his case was not signif-
icantly prejudiced. State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 
345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961). 
—Criminal actions. 
Application of this rule to criminal cases 
would violate a defendant's privilege against 
self-incrimination and his right to remain si-
lent; civil procedures for discovery or inspec-
tion of evidence in possession of adverse party 
do not apply in criminal cases. State v. Niel-
son, 522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. JUT. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §5 130 to 167. 
C.J.S. — 26A C J.S. Depositions §§ 8, 51 et 
seq., 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Party's right to use, as evidence in 
civil trial, his own testimony given upon inter-
rogatories or depositions taken by opponent, 13 
A.L.R.3d 1312. 
Incompetency, taking deposition or serving 
interrogatories in civil case as waiver of, 23 
A.L.R.3d 389. 
Self-incrimination, privilege against, as 
ground for refusal to produce noncorporate doc-
uments in possession of person asserting privi-
lege but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Right of member, officer, agent, or director of 
private corporation or unincorporated associa-
tion to assert personal privilege against self-in-
crimination with respect to production of cor-
porate books or records, 52 AJL.R.3d 636; 87 
A.L.R. Fed. 177. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R3d 303. 
Tort or statutory liability for failure or re-
fusal of witness to give testimony, 61 AL.R.3d 
1297. 
Videotape, use to take deposition for presen-
tation at civil trial in state court, 66 A-L.R.3d 
637. 
Permissibility and standards for use of audio 
recording to take deposition in state civil case, 
13 A.L.R.4th 775. 
B5 t 
Availability of sole sh 
Amendment privilege agair 
tion to resist production of o 
and records — modern statu 
177. 
Rule 31. Depositi 
\ (a) Serving questio 
party may take the tesi 
iipon written questions, 
use of a subpoena as pr 
in prison may be take: 
prescribes. 
A party desiring to 1 
them upon every other ] 
the" person who is to an 
general description suff 
to which he belongs, an 
officer before whom the 
questions may be taken 
association or governme 
30(b)(6). 
.27: Within 30 days after 
may serve cross question 
served with cross quest 
other parties. Within 1! 
• party may serve recross 
.cause shown enlarge oi 
^c_(b) Officer to take n 
and copies of all questio 
; deposition to the officer < 
£in the manner provided 1 
'witness in response to tl 
^ h e deposition, attachin, 
Received by him. 
^ ( c ) Notice of filing. V 
^promptly give notice th 
$V Compiler's Notes. — This r 
yjo.Rule 31, F.R.C.P. 
^Cross-References. — Con 
faction, U.R.CP. 3. 
r.
 ; Filing with the court defined 
.'/Interrogatories to parties, L 
'-'"Partnership defined, § 48-1-
ANALYSIS 
..Officer taking deposition. 
xfj-Determination of objections. 
^Officer taking deposition. 
^Determination of objectior 
:;„. Officer before whom deposit; 
pad no power to pass upon relevj 
„ity, competency or other ground 
tfty; such questions were for com 
&*;: 
'?>•. 
j^Azn. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. : 
gad Discovery §} 168 to 173. 
SX.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Deposit 
£ # ; 65, 80. 
Jj|! A.L.R. _ Disqualification of ai 
84 
26(c) 
i, U R E 611(b) 
»very procedure, 
rial or hearing as 
feedings, mclud-
however, to sus-
sge, a party must 
it to be compelled 
Fed. Sav & Loan 
'2d 1257 (Utah 
bdivision (f)(1) ia 
rather is to safe-
itions. Carter v. 
P2d 1095 (Utah 
i that are riled 
ely public under 
Writings Act (for-
7 Title 63 Chap-
1 cause as to why 
Carter v Utah 
095 (Utah 1990) 
ficer. 
iasioner for mal-
atutory action to 
* apply and tak-
; where court re-
to take deposi-
e had been fur-
se was not sigmf-
urts, 11 Utah 2d 
criminal cases 
privilege against 
ht to remain si-
overy or inspec-
of adverse party 
s. State v Niel-
74) 
nt, or director of 
porated associa 
5 against self m-
•oduction of cor 
LR3d 636, 87 
ley to appear at 
3d 303 
3r failure or re-
>ny, 61 A L R 3d 
ltion for presen 
a t , 66 A L R 3d 
for use of audio 
state civil case, 
85 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 31 
Key Number*. — Depositions *» 17, 56 et 
seq, 62, 64 et seq , 67 to 69, 71, 73 et seq 
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Rule 31. Depositions upon written questions. 
(a) Serving questions; notice. After commencement of the action, any 
party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition 
upon written questions. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the 
use of a subpoena as provided by Rule 45 The deposition of a person confined 
m prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court 
prescribes. 
A party desiring to take a deposition upon written questions shall serve 
them upon every other party with a notice stating (1) the name and address of 
the person who is to answer them, if known, and if the name is not known, a 
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group 
to which he belongs, and (2) the name or descriptive title and address of the 
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. A deposition upon written 
questions may be taken of a public or private corporation or a partnership or 
association or governmental agency in accordance with the provisions of Rule 
30(b)(6). 
Within 30 days after the notice and written questions are served, a party 
may serve cross questions upon all other parties. Within 10 days after being 
served with cross questions, a party may serve redirect questions upon all 
other parties. Within 10 days after being served with redirect questions, a 
party may serve recross questions upon all other parties The court may for 
cause shown enlarge or shorten the time. 
(b) Officer to take responses and prepare record. A copy of the notice 
and copies of all questions served shall be delivered by the party taking the 
deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who shall proceed promptly, 
m the manner provided by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f), to take the testimony of the 
witness in response to the questions and to prepare, certify, and file or mail 
the deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the notice and the questions 
received by him. 
(c) Notice of filing. When the deposition is filed the party taking it shall 
promptly give notice thereof to all other parties. 
Commencement of 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 31, F R C P 
Cross-References. 
action, U R C P 3. 
Filing with the court defined, U R C P 5(e). 
Interrogatories to parties, U R C P 33 
Partnership defined, § 48-1-3 
Persons before whom depositions may be 
taken, U R C P 28 
Service of notice, U R C P 5 
Stipulations regarding discovery procedure, 
U R C P 29 
Use of depositions in court proceedings, 
URC.P 32 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Officer taking deposition 
—Determination of objections. 
Officer taking deposition. 
—Determination of objections. 
Officer before whom deposition was taken 
had no power to pass upon relevancy, material-
ity competency or other ground of admissibil-
ity such questions were for court when deposi-
tion or part of it was offered as evidence Clay-
ton v Ogden State Bank, 82 Utah 564, 26 P 2d 
545 (1933) 
Person taking deposition could not advise 
witness whether to answer question, he was to 
note objection and leave determination of ques-
tions to court. Moormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah 
324, 27 P2d 447 (1933), affd on rehearing, 84 
Utah 345, 35 P 2d 307 (1934) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r 2d. — 23 Am Jur 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 168 to 173 
CJ'.S. — 26A C J S Depositions §§ 47 et 
3eq, 65, 80 
A.L.R. — Disqualification of attorney, other-
wise qualified, to take oath or acknowledgment 
from client, 21 AJLR3d 483 
Tort or statutory liability for failure or re-
fusal of witness to give testimony, 61 A L R 3d 
1297 
Tab 10 
Rule 45 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 114 lis u 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983 — Part IE, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 258; 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1324 et 
seq.;,61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 12 to 14. 
CJ .S . — 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 813 et seq., 
1040; 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 86. 
AJLR. — Federal Civil Procedure Rule 
44(a)(1), sufficiency of authentication of copy of 
domestic official record, 2 AJLK Fed. 306. 
Admissibility, under Rule 803(10) of Federal 
Rules of Evidence, of evidence of absence of 
public record or entry, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 198. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «= 325 to 349; 
Pleading *» 63. 
Rule 45. Subpoena, 
(a) Form; issuance. 
(1) Every subpoena shall: 
(A) issue from the court in which the action is pending; 
(B) state the title of the action, the name of the court from which it 
is issued, the name and address of the party or attorney serving the 
subpoena, and its civil action number; 
(C) command each person to whom it is directed to appear to give 
testimony at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or to produce or to 
permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things in the 
possession, custody or control of that person, or to permit inspection 
of premises, at a time and place therein specified; and 
(D) set forth the text of Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena, 
in substantially similar form to Form 30 in the Appendix of Forms to 
these rules. 
(2) A command to produce or to permit inspection and copying of docu-
ments or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, may be 
joined with a command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, 
or may be issued separately. 
(3) The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a 
party requesting it, who shall complete it before service. An attorney 
admitted to practice in the court in which the action is pending may also 
issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the court. 
(b) Service; scope. 
(1) Generally. 
(A) A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a party 
and is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a 
person named therein shall be made as provided in Rule 4(e) for the 
service of process and, if the person's appearance is commanded, by 
tendering to that person the fees for one day's attendance and the 
mileage allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of the 
United States, or this state, or any officer or agency of either, fees 
and mileage need not be tendered. Prior notice of any commanded 
production or inspection of documents or tangible things or inspec-
tion of premises before trial shall be served on each party in the 
manner prescribed by Rule 5(b). 
(B) Proof of service when necessary shall be made by filing with 
the clerk of the court from which the subpoena is issued a statement 
of the date and manner of service and of the names of the persons 
served, certified by the person who made the service. 
(C) Service of a subpoena outside of this state, for the taking of a 
deposition or production or inspection of documents or tangible 
things or inspection of premises outside this state, shall be made in 
accordance with the requirements of the jurisdiction in which such 
service ia made. 
(2) Subpoena for appearance at trial or hearing. A subpoena command-
ing a witness to appear at a trial or at a hearing pending in this state may 
be served at any place within the state. 
(3) Subpoena for taking deposition. 
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which such 
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is state may 
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deposition only in the county where the person resides, or is em-
ployed, or transacts business in person, or at such other place as the 
court may order. A person who does not reside in this state may be 
required to appear at deposition only in the county in this state 
where the person is served with a subpoena, or at such other place as 
the court may order. 
(B) A subpoena commanding the appearance of a witness at a de-
position may also command, the person to whom it is directed to 
produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible 
things relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examina-
tion permitted by Rule 26(b), but in that event the subpoena will be 
subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b) and paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(4) Subpoena for production or inspection of documents or tangible 
things or inspection of premises. A subpoena to command a person who is 
not a party to produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or 
tangible things or to permit inspection of premises may be served at any 
time after commencement of the action. The scope and procedure shall 
comply with Rule 34, except that the person must be allowed at least 14 
days to comply as stated in subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of this rule. The party 
serving the subpoena shall pay the reasonable cost of producing or copy-
ing the documents or tangible things. Upon the request of any other party 
and the payment of reasonable costs, the party serving the subpoena shall 
provide to the requesting party copies of all documents obtained in re-
sponse to the subpoena, 
(c) Protection of persons subject to subpoenas. 
(1) A party or an attorney responsible for the issuance and service of a 
subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or 
expense on a person subject to that subpoena. The court from which the 
subpoena was issued shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or 
attorney in breach of this duty an appropriate sanction, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, lost earnings and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(2) (A) A subpoena served upon a person who is not a party to produce 
or to permit inspection and copying of documents or tangible things 
or to permit inspection of premises, whether or not joined with a 
command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, must 
allow the person at least 14 days after service to comply, unless a 
shorter time has been ordered by the court for good cause shown. 
_ (B) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection and 
copying of documents or tangible things or to permit inspection of 
premises need not appear in person at the place of production or 
inspection unless also commanded to appear at trial, at hearing, or at 
deposition. 
(C) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection and 
copying of documents or tangible things or inspection of premises 
may, before the time specified for compliance with the subpoena, 
serve upon the party or attorney designated in the subpoena written 
objection to inspection or copying of any or all of the documents or 
tangible things or inspection of the premises. If objection is made, the 
party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to inspect and copy 
the materials or inspect the premises except pursuant to an order of 
the court. If objection has been made, the party serving the subpoena 
may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, move at any 
time for an order to compel the production. Such an order to compel 
production shall protect any person who is not a party or an officer of 
' a party from significant expense resulting from the inspection and 
copying commanded. 
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(3) (A) On timely motion, the court from which a subpoena was issued 
shall quash or modify the subpoena if it: 
(i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance; 
(ii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to ap-
pear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not 
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in per-
son; or requires a non-resident of this state to appear at deposi-
tion in a county other than the county in which the person was 
served; 
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter 
and no exception or waiver applies; 
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden. 
(B) If a subpoena: 
(i) requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information; 
(ii) requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or 
information not describing specific events or occurrences in dis-
pute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the re-
quest of any party; 
(iii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to 
appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not 
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in per-
son; or 
(iv) requires a non-resident of this state who is not a party to 
appear at deposition in a county other than the county in which 
the person was served; 
the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the sub-
poena, quash or modify the subpoena or, if the party serving the 
subpoena shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that 
cannot otherwise be met without undue hardship and assures that 
the person to whom the subpoena is addressed will be reasonably 
compensated, the court may order appearance or production only 
upon specified conditions. 
(d) Duties in responding to subpoena. 
(1) A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents shall pro-
duce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall orga-
nize and label them to correspond with the categories in the demand. 
(2) When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that 
it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the 
claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of 
the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced that 
is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim. 
(e) Contempt Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a 
subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court 
from which the subpoena issued. An adequate cause for failure to obey exists 
when a subpoena purports to require a nonparty to appear or produce at a 
place not within the limits provided by subparagraph (c)(3)(A)(ii). 
(f) Procedure where witness conceals himself or fails to attend. If a 
witness evades service of a subpoena, or fails to attend after service of a 
subpoena, the court may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the county to arrest 
the witness and bring the witness before the court. 
(g) Procedure when witness is confined in jail. If the witness is a pris-
oner confined in a jail or prison within the state, an order for examination in 
the prison upon deposition or, in the discretion of the court, for temporary 
removal and production before the court or officer for the purpose of being 
orally examined, may be made upon motion, with or without notice, by a 
justice of the Supreme Court, or by the district court of the county in which 
the action is pending. 
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Advisory Commit tee Note. — Purposes of 
Amendment. The 1994 amendments represent 
a substantial change from prior practice. Pat-
terned on the 1991 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 45, these amendments expedite and facili-
tate procedures for serving subpoenas, modify 
procedures relating to persons who are not par-
ties to correspond to procedures relating to par-
ties under Utah R. Civ. P. 34, and specify the 
nghia and obligations of persons served with a 
subpoena. 
Paragraph (a). Thi3 paragraph amends for-
mer Rule 45 in the following important re-
spects: 
Firat, subparagraph (a)(6)(3) authorizes an 
attorney to issue and sign a subpoena as an 
officer of the court. The subparagraph elimi-
nates the requirement that an attorney obtain 
a subpoena from the clerk of the court, and the 
requirement that a subpoena be issued under 
seal of the court. An attorney who is not a 
member of the Utah State Bar but who has 
been admitted to practice pro hac vice in the 
court in which the action is pending is autho-
rized to issue a subpoena. Consistent with the 
authority of an attorney to issue a subpoena, 
subparagraph (a)(1)(B) requires every sub-
poena to identify the attorney serving it. Sub-
paragraph (a)(1)(A) requires every subpoena to 
issue from the court in which the action is 
pending, amending former Rule 45(d)(1), which 
authorized a deposition to be issued from the 
court where the deposition is to take place, as 
well as the court where the action is pending. 
Second, subparagraph (a)(2) authorizes a 
party to 3erve upon a person who is not a party 
a 3ubpoena to produce or to permit inspection 
and copying of documents or tangible things, or 
to permit inspection of premises. A party no 
longer must serve a subpoena duces tecum to 
discover documents or tangible things from a 
person who is not a party, although the 
amended rule preserves that option, and no 
longer must bring an independent action for 
entry onto land. Subparagraph (a)(2) also re-
quires a person who is not a party to produce 
materials within that person's control, which 
subjects that person to the 3ame 3cope of dis-
covery as if that person were a party served 
with a discovery request under Rule 34. 
Third, subparagraph (a)(1)(D) requires even' 
subpoena to state the rights and duties of a 
person served in a form substantially similar 
to the form in the Appendix to these rules. 
Paragraph (b) also amends former Rule 45 
in several important respects. Subparagraph 
fb)(l)(A) requires prior notice of each com-
manded production or inspection of documents 
or tangible things, or inspection of premises, to 
be 3erved as prescribed by Rule 5(bj. This sub-
paragraph ensures that other parties will have 
notice enabling them to object to or participate 
in discovery, or to serve a demand for addi-
tional materials. No similar provision is in-
cluded for depositions, because depositions are 
governed by Rule 30 or 31. Subparagraph 
(bKl(A) specifies that the subpoena may be 
served as required by Rule 4(e), amending 
paragraph (c) of the former rule. 
Subparagraph (b)(4) authorizes a subpoena 
for production or inspection of documents or 
tangible things or inspection of premises to be 
served upon a person who is not a party at any 
time after commencement of the action. A sub-
poena served upon a person who is not a party 
has the same scope specified in Rule 34(a) for a 
request served upon a party, and is 3ubject to 
the same procedures specified in Rule 34(b). A 
person who is not a party is not required to file 
a written response to the subpoena, unless the 
party objects to the subpoena pursuant to sub-
paragraph (c)(2)(D). 
Subparagraph (b)(4) also requires each party 
serving a 3ubpoena for the production of docu-
ments to provide to other parties copies of doc-
uments obtained in response to the subpoena. 
No comparable provision appears in the federal 
rule, but the Committee determined that such 
a provision would alleviate some of the burden 
imposed upon persons who are not parties and 
shift it to parties. 
Other subparagraphs make minor amend-
ments to the former Rule 45. Subparagraph 
(b)(1)(C) amends former paragraph (d)(3) to in-
clude a subpoena for document production or 
inspection, as well as a deposition subpoena. 
Subparagraph (b)(2) is the former paragraph 
(e) with minor modifications. Subparagraph 
(b)(3)(A) requires a nonresident to attend depo-
sition only in the county where the nonresident 
is 3erved, amending former paragraph (d)(2) to 
eliminate the requirement that a nonresident 
attend a deposition within forty miles of the 
place of service. 
Paragraph (c). Paragraph (c) states the 
rights of witnesses or other persons served 
with subpoenas. The paragraph does not di-
minish rights conferred by any other rule or 
any other authority. Subparagraph (c)(1) states 
the duty ot an attorney to minimize the burden 
on a witness who is not a party, and specifies 
that such a witness may recover lost earnings 
that result from the misuse of a subpoena. Sub-
paragraph 'c;(D expands the responsibility of 
an attorney stated in Rule 26(g); this responsi-
bility is correlative to the expanded power of 
an attorney to issue a 3ubpoena. 
Subparagraph (c)(2)(A) specifies that a per-
son who is not a party served with a subpoena 
for the production or inspection of documents 
or tangible things or inspection of premises 
must have at least 14 days to respond. A sub-
poena to appear at trial, at hearing, or at depo-
sition must be 3erved within a reasonable time, 
unless it also requires the production of docu-
ments. 
Subparagraph (c)(2)(C) 3tates that a person 
who is not a party has no obligation to make 
copies or to advance costs, and has no counter-
part in either the federal rule or the former 
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state rule. The Committee included this state-
ment in the rule so that it would become part 
of the notice provided to each person served 
with a subpoena. 
Subparagraph (c)(2)(D) specifies that a per-
son served with a subpoena for the production 
or inspection of documents or tangible things 
or inspection of premises may serve written ob-
jection upon the party serving the subpoena. 
The party serving the subpoena bears the bur-
den to obtain an order to compel production, 
and must provide prior notice to the person 
served of the motion to compel. A person 
served with a subpoena to appear at trial, at 
hearing, or at deposition, must appear unless 
the person obtains a court order to quash or 
modify the subpoena; a written objection to the 
serving party is insufficient. A person served 
with a subpoena duces tecum may object to 
providing documents by notifying the party 
serving the subpoena, but still must appear to 
testify at trial, at hearing, or at deposition, un-
less the person obtains an order to quash or 
modify the subpoena. 
Subparagraph (c)(3) identifies the circum-
stances in which a subpoena may be modified 
or quashed. It follows paragraph (c)(3) of the 
1991 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, but is 
modified to specify the locations where resi-
dents or nonresidents of the State may be com-
pelled to attend deposition. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph follows the 
1991 amendments to Fed R. Civ. P. 45. Sub-
paragraph (d)(2)(D) applies to privileged attor-
ney-client communications, and to all attorney 
work product protected under the doctrine of 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and 
progeny. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph specifies that 
an adequate cause for failure to obey exists 
when a subpoena purports to require a party to 
respond at a place beyond the geographic 
boundaries imposed by the rule, amending for-
mer paragraph (f). 
Paragraph (f). This is the former paragraph 
(g), amended to eliminate references to the 
masculine pronoun. 
Paragraph (g). This is the former paragraph 
(h). 
Paragraph (h). This is the former paragraph 
(i), amended to eliminate references to the 
masculine pronoun. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1995, rewrote for-
mer Subdivisions (a) to (f) as Subdivisions (a) 
to (e) and made stylistic and designation 
changes in Subdivisions (e) to (h). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 45, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Civil penalty and 
damages recoverable, § 78-24-7. 
Contempt, § 78-32-1 et seq. 
Definition of subpoena, § 78-24-5. 
Duty of witness served with subpoena, 
§ 78-24-6. 
Fees and mileage of witnesses, § 21-5-4. 
Municipality, rules may govern subpoena is-
sued by, § 10-3-610. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Contempt. 
—Refusal to give testimony. 
Denial of witness fees. 
Production of documentary evidence. 
—Amount of material. 
Service. 
—Mileage and attendance fees. 
Distance between home and court. 
Several pending cases. 
—Waiver. 
Effect on witness. 
Taking of deposition. 
—Command to appear in notice. 
Cited. 
Contempt 
—Refusal to give testimony. 
Denial of witness fees. 
Litigants who were before court and who 
were personally ordered to appear before no-
tary and give testimony for depositions, but 
who refused to obey because witness and mile-
age fees were denied them in advance, al-
though seasonably requested, were guilty of 
contempt, notwithstanding that court may 
have erred in concluding that they were not 
entitled to the fees. Crowther v. District Court, 
93 Utah 586, 54 P.2d 243 (1936). 
Production of documentary evidence. 
—Amount of material. 
Even though former law authorized the issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum, if the number 
of books specified was so great as to be unrea-
sonably burdensome to produce them all in 
court or before the officer, the witness might 
justify his failure to produce them, until such 
time as he or others might be examined to de-
termine which contained relevant matter. 
Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d 703 
(1940). 
Service. 
—Mileage and attendance fees. 
Distance between home and court. 
Mileage was allowed subpoenaed witness for 
entire distance between home of witness and 
place where court was held, or where he was 
required to attend, and not merely from place 
where he was served with subpoena. Holt v. 
Nielson, 37 Utah 566, 109 P. 470 (1910). 
Several pending cases. 
Witnesses subpoenaed and in actual atten-
dance in several cases at the instance of the 
same plaintiff were entitled to their fees in 
each case, though the suits were pending at the 
same time and place. Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah 
512, 65 P. 485 (1901). 
—Waiver. 
Effect on witness. 
Witness could waive strict compliance with 
respect to service of subpoena and still be re-
quired to attend court, and be entitled to mile-
age fees from home to place of trial. Holt v. 
Nielson, 37 Utah 566, 109 P. 470 (1910). 
Taking of deposit ion. 
^Command to appear in : 
To obtain presence of witnei 
taking his deposition, notice a 
scribed by former statute had 
adverse party's attorney, and 
would not voluntarily appear,: 
whom the deposition was to 1 
Am- Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Ju 
§§ 5, 7, 9 to 22. 
C.J.S. — 97 C.J.S. Witnesses 
AX.R. — Privilege against 
tion as ground for refusal to prt 
rate documents in possession o 
ing privilege but owned b-
A L i U d 1373. 
Right of independent expert 
tify as to expert opinion, 50 i 
Compelling testimony of opj 
in state court, 66 A.L.R.4th 2 
Adverse presumption or infe 
state's failure to produce or ei 
Rule 46. Exception 
Formal exceptions to r 
sufficient that a party, at 
sought, makes known to 
take or his objection to tin 
a party has no opportunit 
the absence of an object: 
Compiler's Notes. — This r 
tially similar to Rule 46, F.RJ 
ANALYSIS 
Form of verdict. 
—Duty to examine and object 
In general. 
Instructions. 
—Right to object. 
Harmless error. 
Cited 
Form of verdict. 
—Duty to exaxnine and obje< 
Counsel has the obligation not 
to the form of the verdict, but to 
seek to examine it; by failing to 
permission to examine the vers 
objection to it, party waived an 
the verdict form. Martineau v. , 
P^d 1039 (Utah 1981). 
In general. 
To preserve a question for app 
tion must be clear and concise a 
( 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 
Review § 614. 
CJ.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and I 
seq. 
AJ-R. — Sufficiency in federal 
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Taking of deposition. 
—Command to appear in notice. 
To obtain presence of witness for purpose of 
taking his deposition, notice and affidavit pre-
scribed by former statute had to be served on 
adverse party's attorney, and then if witness 
would not voluntarily appear, the officer before 
whom the deposition was to be taken had to 
issue subpoena for his appearance; a command 
to witness to appear contained in notice or affi-
davit would be ineffective. Olson v. District 
Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P.2d 529, 112 A.L.R. 
438 (1937). 
Cited in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses 
§§ 5, 7, 9 to 22. 
C.J.S. — 97 CJ.S. Witnesses §§ 19 to 34, 45. 
A.L.R. — Privilege against self-mcrimina-
tion as ground for refusal to produce noncorpo-
rate documents in possession of person assert-
ing privilege but owned by another, 37 
AL.R.3d 1373. 
Right of independent expert to refuse to tes-
tify as to expert opinion, 50 A-L.R4th 680. 
Compelling testimony of opponent's expert 
in state court, 66 A.L.R.4th 213. 
Adverse presumption or inference based on 
state's failure to produce or examine law en-
forcement personnel — modern cases, 81 
AX.R.4th 872. 
Adverse presumption or inference based on 
party's failure to produce or examine trans-
feror, transferee, broker, or other person alleg-
edly involved in transaction at issue — modern 
cases, 81 A-LJUth 939. 
Requirements, under Rule 45(c) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 17(d) of Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to 
service of subpoena and tender of witness fees 
and mileage allowance, 77 A. L i t Fed. 863. 
Key Numbers. — Witnesses *=» 7 to 22, 33. 
Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if 
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 46, F.R.CJP. 
Cross-References. — Objections to instruc-
tions to jury, U.R.C.P. 51. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Form of verdict. 
—Duty to examine and object 
In general. 
Instructions. 
—Right to object. 
Harmless error. 
Cited. 
Form of verdict 
—Duty to examine and object 
Counsel has the obligation not only to object 
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively 
3eek to examine it; by failing to request court 
permission to examine the verdict and make 
objection to it, party waived any objection to 
the verdict form. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 
P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981). 
In general. 
To preserve a question for appeal, an objec-
tion must be clear and concise and made in a 
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon. 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Instructions. 
—Right to object 
The parties have a right to make objections 
to the instructions to preserve challenges to 
their accuracy; if counsel was prevented from 
making objections to instructions, he should, 
under this rule, be deemed to have done so. 
Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 
564 (1960). 
Harmless error. 
If the instructions are correct, any error 
which prevents counsel from making objections 
thereto ia harmless error. Hanks v. 
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 
(1960). 
Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1981); Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review § 614. 
CJ.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 202 et 
aeq. 
A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-
tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection 
to evidence absent contemporary objection at 
trial, 76 A.Lit Fed. 619. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error •» 169 
et seq., 248. 
Tab 11 
Art. I, $ 14 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References, — Controlled Sub-
stances Act search warrants, § 58-37-10 
Liquor search, 
5 32A-13-103 
seizure and forfeiture 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A>AJLYSIS 
In general. 





Consent to search 
—Who may consent 
Drugs 
Evidence voluntarily surrendered. 
Exclusionary rule 
Hair samples 
Information used to support warrant. 




Neutral and detached magistrate. 
Particular description 
Plain view 
P m a t e searches 
Probable cause 
—Veracity of witness 
Reasonable expectation of privacy 
Scope of search 
Search 
Search incident to arrest. 
Search warrant 
—Validity 
Search without warrant 
—Delay before search 
—Propriety 
Standing to object to search 
—Stolen vehicle 
Stopping for criminal in\estigation 
Cited 
In general. 
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum nor 
under a motion to examine will an examina-
tion be permitted of a nature to contravene 
pro\ision against unreasonable searches and 
seizures Evans v Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P 2d 
703 (1940) 
It is generally recognized that the legitimate 
use of a search warrant is restricted to public 
prosecutions, and in no event may such pro-
ceeding be invoked for the protection of a mere 
private right Allen v Trueman, 100 Utah 36 
110 P2d 355 (1941) 
It is use to which it is put that renders prop-
erty, otherwise lawful and rightful to have, use 
and possess, subject to seizure and forfeiture 
Hemenwav & Moser Co v Funk, 100 Utah 72 
106 P2d 779 (1940) 
For general discussion of fourth amendment 
to federal Constitution, see Citv of Price v 
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P 2d "606 (1948) 
Whether a search and seizure is reasonable 
is to be determined by the trial court, and evi-
dence in plain view of the officer pursuing a 
felon may be rightfully seized and such seizure 
is not a violation of the federal constitutional 
protection as set forth in Mapp v Ohio, 367 
U S 643, 81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081 
(1961) State v Allred, 16 Utah 41, 395 P 2d 
535 11964) 
No illegal search and seizure occurred where 
police went to defendant's apartment pursuant 
to a tip, were voluntarily admitted by another 
defendant, saw articles taken in burglary in 
plain sight on kitchen table and were shown 
other stolen merchandise willingly by defen-
dant State v Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P2d 
435 (1973). 
Where, although investigation was in its 
preliminary stages, police officers realized 
there was a possibility that defendant had com-
mitted rape and homicide that they were inves-
tigating, and feared that he might try to escape 
or obtain a weapon if he got out of their sight 
their conduct in accompanying him into his 
bedroom while he finished dressing and in ob-
serving shirt with long strands of hair resem-
bling that of the victim which shirt and hair 
were in plain sight, did not constitute an un-
reasonable search and seizure, nor was taking 
defendant s clothes afu 
subjecting them to scu 
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defendant's clothes after he was arrested and 
subjecting them to scientific scrutiny, an un-
reasonable search and seizure State v Sims, 
30 Utah 2d 251, 516 P 2d 354 (1973), cert de-
nied, 417 U S 970, 94 S Ct 3175, 41 L Ed 2d 
1141 (1974) 
Administrative inspections and searches. 
This section and the fourth amendment of 
the federal constitution protect against war-
rantless administrative inspections and 
searches of business establishments for pur-
poses of enforcing the Utah Occupational 
Health and Safety Act of 1973 State Indus 
Comm'n v Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co , 594 
P 2d 894 (Utah 1979) 
Automobile search. 
Evidence taken from automobile defendant 
was driving and subsequently used to convict 
him of burglary and grand larceny did not vio-
late constitutional proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, even though 
taking was not connected with cause of arrest 
and was done without search warrant in view 
of facts that car was lawfully taken into posses-
sion and impounded when defendant was ar-
rested for driving automobile which did not be-
long to him and without valid driver's license 
and since, under such circumstances, it was re-
sponsibility of police impounding car to take 
inventory of its contents State v Criscola, 21 
Utah 2d 272, 444 P 2d 517 (1968) 
Defendant charged with possession of stolen 
money orders, which were found in the car of 
another person, was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing which would afford him an opportu-
nity to challenge the search and seizure 
United States v Smith, 495 F 2d 668 (10th Cir 
1972) 
Examination of exterior of automobile 
parked in plain sight at motel did not consti-
tute such violation of privacy as to violate this 
section State v Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 
P 2d 1259 (1972) 
Where accused sold his car voluntarily 
through the agency of another to a part-time 
deputy sheriff, evidence from subsequent 
search was admissible State v Redford, 27 
Utah 2d 379, 496 P 2d 884 (1972) 
Officer, who received radio notification that 
service station in vicinity had just been robbed 
and that the felon was observed running in a 
northwesterly direction from the service sta-
tion, was justified in stopping automobile in 
well-lighted intersection approximately three 
blocks northwest of service station and in ar-
resting defendant who closely fitted description 
of fleeing felon, money found on floor of auto-
mobile subsequent to defendants arrest was 
the product of a search incident to a lawful 
arrest State v Torres, 29 Ltah 2d 269, 508 
P 2 d 534 (1973) 
A warrantless search was not unreasonable 
where officer stopped a van traveling upon the 
road that matched the description of one seen 
at the scene of the crime and conducted the 
search of the van after having asked and re-
ceived permission from the driver to do so 
State v Angus, 581 P 2d 992 (Utah 1978) 
Warrantless seizure of stolen property, 
which was in plain view of the police officers as 
they first approached the car during an investi-
gatory stop and which was subsequently iden-
tified by the true owner, from the back seat of 
the car after the occupants had been arrested 
and the car impounded was not unreasonable 
State v Ballenberger, 652 P 2d 927 (Utah 
1982) 
Warrantless search of defendant's automo-
bile and the seizure of a sawed-off shotgun 
found under the front seat were reasonable and 
therefore lawful under the open view doctrine, 
as well as being incident to a lawful arrest, 
where police officers made a valid warrantless 
arrest of defendant near his automobile for vio-
lating his parole conditions and attempted 
flight to avoid arrest, the arrest ing officer ob-
served through an open door shotgun shells ly-
ing between the automobile seats, and there 
were other suspects loose in the area and shots 
were being fired, under such circumstances, it 
was reasonable and lawful for the arrest ing of-
ficer to search under the front seat, where he 
found the sawed off shotgun, to prevent the de-
fendant or others from getting their hands on 
weapons State v Kent, 665 P 2d 1317 (Utah 
1983) 
Police are not authorized to stop northbound 
vehicles simph because they contain "Latin-
appeanng" occupants and display suspect state 
license plates a contrary holding would sub-
stantially interfere with those travelers' pro-
tection from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures State v Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181 (Utah 
1987) 
Defendant who was simply a passenger who 
happened to be taking his turn driving when 
the car was pulled over had no standing to 
challenge the search of the car State v DeAlo, 
748 P 2 d 194 (Ltah Ct App 1987) 
Opening a car door to inspect the vehicle 
identification number was an unreasonable 
search, where the car was found parked on a 
street and police officers could h a \ e easily ob-
tained a warrant for a search of it State v 
Larocco, 135 Ltah Adv Rep 16 a990) 
—Inventory. 
The state fails to meet its burden of estab-
lishing the necessity for a warrantless inven-
tory search of the vehicle of an arrested person 
in the face of evidence that the arrestee was 
given no opportunity to arrange for disposition 
of his own car State v Hygh 711 P 2d 264 
i Ltah 1985) 
The search of an impounded vehicle of an 
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arrested person is not a valid inventory search 
where the police department, in conducting the 
inventor)' search, fails to follow a regularized 
set of procedures which are drafted to guard 
against arbitrariness by an officer in the field. 
State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
Blood samples . 
The taking of defendant's blood sample with-
out a warrant did not constitute an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure where after defen-
dant's arrest on a warrant, the state filed a 
motion to compel discovery of body fluids, de-
fendant and his counsel were notified, an ad-
versary hearing was held, and the magistrate 
ordered the taking of the blood sample. State v. 
Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983). 
City o rd inance . 
City ordinance allegedly enacted pursuant to 
powers granted by § 10-8-50, providing that 
right of people of city "to be secure in their 
persons, bouses, papers and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated," and making violation thereof misde-
meanor, was void for vagueness and uncer-
tainty in failing to define or prescribe stan-
dards to determine what acts constitute unrea-
sonable searches or seizures. City of Price v. 
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948). 
Consen t to sea rch . 
Prosecution has the burden of establishing 
from the totality of the circumstances that the 
consent to search was voluntarily given; fac-
tors which may show a lack of duress or coer-
cion in obtaining the consent include: the ab-
sence of a claim of authority to search by the 
officers; the absence of an exhibition of force by 
the officers; a mere request to search; coopera-
tion by the owner of the object to be searched; 
and the absence of deception or trick on the 
part of the officers. State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103 (Utah 1980 L 
—Who may c o n s e n t 
Search made with consent of defendant's 
mother was not unlawful where defendant 
lived at his mother's home and she had will-
ingly agreed to the search and later testified 
that she knew she could have refused to do so. 
State v. Kelsey. 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975). 
Where defendant lived with his mother in 
her house trailer, she could give consent to a 
warrantless search of the trailer, and if the 
state satisfied its burden of proof that from the 
totality of the circumstances the consent of the 
mother had been voluntarily given, evidence 
obtained would be admissible. State v. Durand, 
569 P.2d 1107 Utah 1977). 
Drugs . 
Marijuana taken during the search of defen-
dant's home pursuant to warrant was unlaw-
fully taken and evidence should have been sup-
pressed on defendant's motion because search 
warrant was based on police officer's oral depo-
sition rather than on oath or affirmation. State 
v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 844 (1968i. 
Marijuana had not been obtained by illegal 
search and seizure where police officers had 
driven over to plane, and through the open pi-
lot's door had seen that the plane was tightly 
stacked from floor to ceiling with plastic bun-
dles which they recognized as marijuana. State 
v. Simpson, 541 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1975). 
There was no constitutionally prohibited 
search by police officer where such officer, 
without any warrant, acting upon reliable in-
formation that marijuana was being grown in 
a house, walked up the driveway of the house 
and observed in plain view growing marijuana 
plants, and the officer then withdrew from the 
premises keeping such under surveillance 
until defendant came out and watered the 
plants at which time the officer arrested defen-
dant for committing a public offense in the offi-
cer's presence and confiscated the contraband 
plants incident to the arrest. State v. 
Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 (Utah 1980). 
E v i d e n c e voluntar i ly s u r r e n d e r e d . 
Evidence voluntarily surrendered to police 
officer by codefendant after his arrest was not 
a product of illegal search and seizure by vir-
tue of allegedly illegal arrest where officer had 
reasonable grounds for making the arrest. 
State v. Bray, 30 Utah 2d 121, 514 P.2d 537 
(1973). 
E x c l u s i o n a r y rale. 
The exclusionary rule does not require the 
suppression of otherwise legally seized evi-
dence merely because it was obtained in the 
same search as evidence illegally seized; in 
such case, only the illegally seized evidence 
should be suppressed. State v. Romero, 660 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). 
Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a 
necessary consequence of police violations of 
this section. State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 16 (1990). 
H a i r s a m p l e s . 
The extraction of hair samples from defen-
dant's head pursuant to an allegedly defective 
search warrant did not violate defendant's con-
stitutional rights since, generally, the simple 
extraction of hair samples from the body of the 
accused is so minimal and unintrusive as to be 
a reasonable search, even absent a warrant for 
the purpose. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 
'Utah 1980). 
In fo rmat ion used to suppor t w a r r a n t . 
Assuming warrantless search and seizure of 
an envelope and its contents to be in violation 
of the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, use of testimony of a witness, which testi-
mony related to the same subject matter of the 
envelope, in affidavit 
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fier of the 
envelope, in affidavit to support issuance of a 
search warrant was proper where testimony 
was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of 
the contents of the envelope obtained by an 
illegal search so as to break the chain of cau-
sality. State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699 (Utah 
1981) (one justice concurring in the result and 
two justices dissenting). 
Invalid search warrant 
Fact that search warrant was invalid be-
cause of failure of affidavit to state sufficient 
facts to justify its issuance did not establish 
that search of defendant's automobile pursuant 
to the warrant was unreasonable since war-
rant was valid on its face and police officers 
had been informed that defendant had partici-
pated in burglary. State v. Farnsworth, 30 
Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974). 
Inventory search. 
Warrantless search of defendant's suitcase 
and the seizure of a controlled substance found 
therein did not violate defendant's constitu-
tional protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures because it was within 
the inventory search exception to the search 
warrant requirement where officer stopped de-
fendant for a speeding violation and arrested 
defendant after discovering that he was 
wanted on a fugitive warrant; after the arrest 
the officer removed a suitcase from defendant's 
automobile for purposes of safekeeping; officer 
opened the suitcase for purposes of making an 
inventory of its contents for safekeeping and 
return to defendant after defendant stated tha t 
the suitcase contained a large sum of cash and 
a loaded firearm; there was no allegation that 
the inventory of the suitcase was for investiga-
tive purposes; and the suitcase was inventoried 
in the presence of defendant as he had re-
quested. State v. Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484 (Utah 
1980) (one justice concurring with comment 
and two justices dissenting). 
J u v e n i l e s . 
Juvenile was entitled to the constitutional 
protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). 
L iquor . 
Where police officers were investigating 
rooming house under city ordinance to deter-
mine if liquor was being sold there, and propri-
etor during investigation drank from bottle of 
liquor and gave some to another person, the 
seizure of the liquor bv the officers was legal. 
Salt Lake City v. Wight, 60 Utah 108, 205 P. 
900 (1922). 
Unchallenged entry of liquor control com-
mission agents into club to determine if it 
would make unlawful sales to them was not a 
warrantless search and did not become so by 
their purchase of any alcoholic drink. 
DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 
613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980). 
Neutral and detached magistrate. 
Judge issuing a search war ran t did not lose 
his character as a neutral and detached magis-
trate where he went to a home at the request of 
the police who had searched the home under a 
warrant issued by another magistrate, viewed 
the evidence, and issued a search warrant, 
which was immediately executed. State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). 
Particular description. 
The requirement of particularity of descrip-
tion, and what constitutes such a description, 
is set forth clearly and at length in Allen v. 
Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242, 249, 
modified on rehearing and petition denied, 103 
Utah 599, 139 P.2d 233 (1943). 
Plain view. 
Objects falling within the plain view of a po-
lice officer from a position where he is entitled 
to be are not the subject of an unlawful search. 
In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981). 
Under the plain-view exception to the search 
warrant requirement, a warrantless seizure of 
items is justified if the officer doing the seizing 
is lawfully present where the search and sei-
zure occur, the items are in plain view, and the 
items are clearly incriminating. State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). 
P r iva te searches . 
The protections of the fourth amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution do not apply to searches 
or seizures made by persons other than govern-
ment officers and agents. State v. Newbold, 
581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972). 
Unreasonable private searches are not sub-
ject to the protection of this section. State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988). 
A search conducted by a private person act-
ing as the agent of a governmental authority is 
not a private search, and the burden of estab-
lishing governmental involvement in a private 
search rests upon the party objecting to the 
evidence. State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1988). 
P robab l e cause. 
Since our Constitution requires a showing of 
probable cause to support a search warrant, an 
affidavit based merely on information and be-
lief fails to meet the constitutional require-
ments. Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 
920 (1939). 
Search warrant which stated, among other 
things, that deputy had reason to believe prop-
erty was stolen, with an inventory of such 
property attached to affidavit, that evidence 
tended to show felony had been committed and 
that certain witnesses had revealed informa-
tion as to person committing felony showed 
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sufficient probable cause. State v Smelser. 23 
Utah 347, 463 P.2d 562, cert, denied. 398 U.S. 
966, 90 S. Ct. 2181. 26 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1970). 
Under the fourth amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, no probable cause justifying sei-
zure of defendant's truck without warrant ex-
isted where the sole justification for the seizure 
was officer's belief that the truck had been in-
volved in another crime and the record was 
void of any evidence to support that belief. 
State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 
422 (1971). 
Where police officer received report describ-
ing robbery suspect as a black man with a 
scraggly beard, wearing a green field jacket 
and blue stocking cap and ea rn ing a .22 cali-
ber pearl-handled revolver, then spotted an au-
tomobile occupied by two black men. followed 
and stopped car, and upon observing that pas-
senger had scraggly beard and wore green field 
jacket, searched vehicle and found blue stock-
ing cap and pearl-handled .22 caliber revolver, 
he had probable cause to search vehicle and 
arrest passenger, and evidence taken from car 
was properly admitted as evidence at robbery 
prosecution. State v. Dixon, 531 P.2d 1301 
ru t ah 1975). 
—Veraci ty of wi tness . 
The average neighbor witness is not the type 
of informant in need of independent proof of 
reliability or veracity in determining probable 
cause for issuance of a search warrant. State v. 
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Defendant could not have reasonably ex-
pected privacy as to the marijuana plants 
growing in open view in a field, and the war-
rantless seizure of the marijuana plants was 
lawful, where the deputies discovered the de-
fendant along with the marijuana plants in an 
open field of a rural area with no dwelling 
houses or other buildings nearby, the deputies 
saw no gates where the road entered the field 
nor any no trespassing signs, the road had 
been patrolled on previous occasions and there 
was nothing to indicate to the deputies that 
they were entering private property, the road 
was used by other landowners in the area as a 
means of access to their lands, and defendant 
did not actually hold title to the field, but had 
signed an earnest money agreement and in-
tended to purchase it. State v. Shreve. 667 P.2d 
590 (Utah 1983). 
Scope of s ea rch . 
The limitation on the scope of a search pur-
suant to a warrant is drawn in terms of those 
areas where it is reasonable to believe that the 
listed evidence could be located, and is not lim-
ited to areas where most people would place 
the listed items of evidence. State v. Romero 
660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). 
Sea rch . 
Where police officer lawfully entered upon 
defendant's property at night by a pathway 
leading to the front door, and the purpose of 
such entry was for other than searching defen-
dant's truck, and while on the property police 
officer observed, with the aid of a flashlight, in 
plain view through an unobstructed window in 
the truck, stolen property, police officer's ob-
servation did not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the constitutional protection 
against unreasonable searches, and the war-
rantless seizure of the stolen property was not 
the result of an unconstitutional search and 
the property was admissible into evidence. 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert, denied, 
454 U.S. 1057, 102 S. Ct. 606, 70 L. Ed. 2d 595 
(1981). 
Search incident to arres t 
Where police recognized woman passenger in 
defendant's car as a person for whose arrest a 
warrant was outstanding, stopped the car to 
arrest her, and in the course of the encounter 
asked to see defendant's driver's license, then 
radioed for a check on warrants outstanding 
against him, found there was one and arrested 
him, they had acted correctly, and a weapon 
found on defendant's person during the search 
incident to arrest was properly admitted at his 
trial on concealed weapons charge. State v. 
Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976). 
Where police officers on a rooftop, observing 
prostitution activity, saw through an open win-
dow of an adjoining building a man inject a 
substance from a bottle into his and others' 
arms, and then return the bottle to an adjoin-
ing bedroom, the police had probable cause to 
arrest for a drug violation and to seize the bot-
tle which was in plain view in the adjoining 
bedroom. State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1977). 
Warrantless search of the room in which de-
fendant was lawfully arrested was valid even 
though defendant was handcuffed while in the 
room where the search was made; evidence 
found in a wastebasket in the room was in 
plain view. State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 
1978). 
Fact that search may have been conducted 
immediately before the formal arrest does not 
invalidate the search nor preclude its charac-
terization as being incident to the arrest where 
the search and arrest are substantially con-
temporaneous, and probable cause for the ar-
rest exists independent of evidence obtained 
from the search. State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 
( U u h 1978); In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). 
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The Utah Supreme Court abandoned the 
Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged standard for de-
termining the validity of a search warrant and 
adopted the new standard, which looks at the 
totality of the circumstances and holds that the 
affidavit should be viewed in its entirety and 
in a common sense fashion. Sta te v. Espinoza, 
723 P.2d 420 tfJtah \9S6>. 
Search without warrant 
—Delay before search. 
Police delay before a warrantless search does 
not necessarily negate exigency of circum-
stance. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1987). 
Officers' failure to avail themselves of an 
earlier opportunity to obtain a warrant does 
not automatically preclude them from acting 
upon exigent circumstances arising thereafter, 
and the fact that the exigency may have been 
foreseeable at the time the decision was made 
to forego or postpone obtaining a warrant does 
not control the legality of a subsequent war-
rantless search triggered by tha t exigency. 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). 
—Propr ie ty . 
The state carries the burden of showing that 
a warrantless search was lawful. State v. 
Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (1990). 
S t a n d i n g to object to s e a r c h . 
Defendant lacked standing to object to 
search of automobile and attache case found 
therein where he conceded that he did not own. 
the property searched and failed to show that 
he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in 
such effects. State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1*334 
(Utah 1984). 
Defendant had no standing to object to a 
search of the vehicle he was driving, where the 
police investigation revealed tha t the vehicle 
was registered to a person other than defen-
dant, and there was no showing tha t he had 
driven it with the permission of the owner or 
that he had borrowed it under circumstances 
that would imply permissive use. State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant lacked standing to object to a 
search of an automobile that he had stolen 
since he had no possessory or proprietary inter-
est in the stolen auto. State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 
441 (Utah 1978). 
—Stolen vehicle. 
Where prior to a warrantless search, police 
knew that the car was registered in defen-
dant's name and that it was parked in front of 
defendant's home, the search itself corrobo-
rated other information indicating that it was 
the stolen vehicle, defendant had not declared 
beforehand that he had no interest in the vehi-
cle, and proving that the car was stolen is one 
of the critical facts to be established a t trial, 
defendant has standing to challenge the legal-
ity of the search. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 
(Utah C t App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (1990). 
S topping for c r imina l inves t iga t ion . 
Police officer had an objective credible rea-
son to enter a laundromat and ask defendants 
what they were doing and for identification 
where he knew that there had been several 
thefts in the area, he observed the defendants 
alone in the laundromat, he knew from previ-
ous encounters that they were from out of town 
and had been in possession of contraband and a 
bag of coins. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 
103 (Utah 1980). 
Police officers were justified in making in-
vestigation of defendant and a companion who 
were found late at night in an area known to 
have a high rate of burglaries, the two had 
made suspicious movements while driving 
their car, one officer saw radio equipment in 
the car after he found the two ,with their car 
stopped and its hood raised, and defendant 
could not produce any identification; fact that 
during the investigation officers questioned 
the two in separate police cars, after giving the 
Miranda warnings, did not violate defendant's 
rights where there was no evidence that he 
was unduly restrained; and, officers had proba-
ble cause to make a warrantless arrest of de-
fendant where, during the questioning, defen-
dant's companion, after having been con-
fronted with differences in his story with, the 
defendant's, admitted to stealing the radio and 
implicated defendant in the theft. State v. 
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
Police officer's stopping of a driver was not a 
random stop constituting an unreasonable sei-
zure where the officer knew the driving license 
of the driver had been revoked and had a rea-
sonable suspicion that it was still revoked at 
the time he stopped the driver; where, after 
questioning the driver, the officer learned that 
the license was in fact still revoked, the officer 
properly arrested the driver for driving while 
his license was revoked. State v. Gibson, 666 
i n 
Art. I, § 15 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
P.2d 1302 iUtah), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 894, Cited in State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1301 
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983). (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as 
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the fact. 
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